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THE OPINIONS OF JUDGE EDGERTON A STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Simon Rosenzweig*
In the 14 years since Henry W. Edgerton became a circuit judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District. of Columbia
Circuit he has created a body of judicial writing that will have an
increasing impact upon the development of the law. The influence of
his work rests in part upon the enlightened and progressive precedents
his decisions have set; in part upon the profound critical expositions in
his dissenting opinions; in part upon his creative use of the implements
and materials with which a judge must work; and finally upon his
courageous declaration of principles in the most honored traditions of our
democracy. But above all, his work is shaped by a deep current of
determination to effect justice and to announce principles and reach
results that will best serve the interests of society. On this account, and
also because his work exemplifies an important trend in American
judicial thought, his opinions merit study.
THE MAINSPRINGS OF JUDGE EDGERTON'S THINKING

Function of the Law and the Judge
Judge Edgerton's work is in the main stream of man's age-old quest
for justice, justice between man and man, between man and his government, and in the general ordering of things. "We should decide the
question before us 'in accordance with present-day standards of wisdom
and justice rather than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated
rule of the past' . . ."I Concern for justice echoes throughout Judge
Edgerton's decisions.
But in every era many have avowed the objective of justice. The
merit of the avowal depends upon the meaning of "justice." In our own
time judges find little opportunity to expatiate upon its meaning. They
teach us their conception of justice more by what they decide than by
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 256, for biographical
I

data.
Dissent in Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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what they say. This is especially true of Judge Edgerton, with whom
economy of expression and directness of decision are as much a mandate
of office as a characteristic of style.
Yet sparse though they are, general statements of his idea of justice
'2
may be found scattered through his opinions. It involves "fairness,"
'
"custom and convenience," but above all the good of society. 4 In a
case of first impression the law should be declared "with a view to the
social interests which seem to be involved and with such aid as we can
get from authorities elsewhere and from 'logic, and history, and custom,
and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct'." 5 Mechanical
standards such as speed and uniformity are not the most important
considerations.'
A lawsuit is not a game in which the judge tallies the arguments of
counsel and awards the decision on points. He has an active duty to make
the just decision. "A procedural question not raised by the parties
lurks in the record." 7 "This is not the relief which appellant depositors
ask. ... but the court may grant the appropriate relief for which appellants failed to ask."'
That judges make policy is so clear to Judge Edgerton that he is ever
concerned with the wisdom of the- policy inherent in a decision.' But
however others may regard it,10 judicial freedom is not unlimited. This
2 Amalgamated Casualty Ins. Co. v. Winslow, 135 F. 2d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
United States v. Boyer, 150 F. 2d 595, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
3 Gladden v. Walker & Dunlop, Inc., 168 F. 2d 321, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
4 "No doubt contribution seems just as between the tortfeasors, but a recent study by
Professor James of the Yale Law School leads me to doubt whether it is good for society."
Dissent in George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F. 2d 219, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
See also Eastburn v. Levin, 113 F. 2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Clark v. Associated
Retail Credit Men of Washington, D.C., 105 F. 2d 62, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
5 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, D.C., 105 F. 2d 62, 64 (D.C.
Cir. 1939). The phrases Edgerton quotes are from CARnozo, TnE NATURE or
JumciAr
PROCESS 112, 113 (1937). Years before Edgerton became a judge he wrote: "'Just' means,
not merely fair.as between the parties, but socially advantageous, as serving, directly and
indirectly, the most important of the competing individual and social interests involved."
Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. or]PA. L. REV. 343, 373 (1924).
6 National Rifle -Ass'n of America v. Young, 134 F. 2d 524, 526 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. National War Labor Board, 143 F. 2d
145, 147 (D. C. Cir. 1944). Cf. Edgerton, supra note 5, at 346.
7 Nicolson v. Brown, 135 F. 2d 245, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1943).

8 Cooper v. Goldsmith, 135 F.2d 949, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
9 Colpoys v. Foreman, 163 F. 2d 908, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947). See also dissent in Mays v.

Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1945); dissent in Hall v. United States, 168 F. 2d

161, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 853 (D.C. Cir. 1948); dissent in
Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. 2d 167, 169 (D.C. Cir.) rev'd, 335 U. S. 410 (1948).
10 The problem of the extent of judicial freedom has been one of the main preoccupations
of students of the law. Cardozo declared: "The judge as the interpreter for the community
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has sometimes been expressed by the epigram: Ours is a government
of laws, not of men." The functions of the judge, and especially of the

appellate judge, are set within the framework of our governmental
system. Therefore Judge Edgerton adheres to the literal meaning of a

Congressional mandate in the 0. P. A. legislation 2 and is critical of
"some of the State court cases on which the dissenting opinion relies"
in which the principle adopted l3 "is a euphemism which covers judicial
refusal to follow a legislative mandate addressed to the court."' 4
The special reverence in which courts have come to be held' 1 has
obscured the down to earth fact that judges are government officers
and courts government agencies, not tribunals separate and distinct from

government.' 6 Nor should courts usurp the prerogatives of other
agencies.' 7
In a democracy government must be responsive to the will of the

people. The legislative process is the closest approximation to this goal.
of its sense of law and order must supply omissions, correct uncertainties and harmonize
results with justice through a method of free decision . . ." CARnozo, THE NATURE Or TH
JunIciAL PROCESS 16 (1937). Edgerton, in his pre-judicial period, writing of Judge Cuthbert
W. Pound of the New York Court of Appeals, said: "Few judges have recognized so
frankly the existence, within limits, of free judicial choice." Edgerton, A Liberal Judge:
Cuthbert W. Pound, 21 CoRNxr. L.Q. 7, 15 (1935).
-1 See Wormuth, Aristotle on Law in EssAys n PorancAL THEORY 45 et seq. (1948);
MAson, BRANDsss: LAWYER AND JUDGE IN THE MODERN STATE 4-5 (1933) ; for a discussion
of the origin of this phrase. Clearly, however, the make-up of the judge and his views are
considered in his selection. Is this not a recognition that they will affect his action?
12 In making it obligatory to issue an injunction, upon application by the Price Administrator, restraining O.P.A. violations, Edgerton holds "shall" means "must" and not
"may". The Supreme Court, on the other hand, departed from the literal phrasing of the
statute and reversed.
13 That "shall" means "may".
14 Brown v. The Hecht Co., 137 F. 2d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1943), rev'd, 321 U.S. 321
(1944). Cf. Millis v. Inland Empire District Council, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union,
144 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1944), aff'd, 325 U.S. 697 (1945). See also dissent in Beach v.
United States, 144 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1944), rev'd, 324"U.S. 193 (1945); Garrett v.
District of Columbia, 159 F. 2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 835 (1947).
15 "In no country in the world today has the lawyer a standing remotely comparable
with his place in American politics. The respect in which the federal courts and, above
all, the Supreme Court are held is hardly surpassed by the influence they exert on the life
of the United States." LAsxx, THE AmERiCAx DraocRAcY 110, 112 (1948). But see
Lleweliyn, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology, 62 HAv. L. REv. 1286 (1949).
16 Dissent in Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F. 2d 233, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U. S. 24
(1948).
17 Dissent in Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products Co., 160 F. 2d 259, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1947),
petition for writ of certiorari dismissed on motion of counsel for petitioner, 331 U. S.
786 (1947) ; National War Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 144 F. 2d 528,
530 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944). Cf. Magnaflux Corporation v.
Coe, 139 F. 2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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But courts, especially in the federal system in which judges are appointed
and do not even submit their record to popular referendum periodically,
are as least twice removed from the people. Judge Edgerton, concerned
with threats to "a democratic society,"" especially by officers of government itself, warns of the delicate balance courts must observe in effecting
justice and yet not impairing "the democratic process." Dissenting
against disregard of express statutory language, Judge Edgerton declares
that the court "thereby substitutes for a constitutional and relatively
democratic process [i.e., legislation] one that is neither democratic nor
constitutional."' 9
The Role of Precedent
Perhaps the most important implement in the common law judicial
workshop is precedent. It can become the oppressive hand of the dead
past. Blindly applied it often works injustice. In the hands of a wise
and liberal judge it makes for stability in the law yet does not prevent
the creative molding of the law toward the just result. The ability to
achieve this seemingly paradoxical ena is a crucial test of judicial
greatness.
There are several levels in the hierarchy of precedent.20 The first of
these, and the least compelling, are the decisions of courts of other
coordinate jurisdictions. Yet courts are prone in a case of first impression
to be swayed by such decisions. But Judge Edgerton, protesting against
the decision of the majority of his court that misrepresentation as to one's
intention could not be the basis of the crime of larceny by false pretenses,
declares: "The court holds that 'the great weight of authority... compels
us.' This is a new rule and an important one. I think it is erroneous.
Usually there are good reasons for a doctrine which is widely accepted,
and uniformity itself has some value even in criminal law. Accordingly
we should consider the weight of authority elsewhere for what it may be
worth. But we should not determine our action by a count of foreign
cases regardless of logic, consistency, and social need. 'The social value
of a rule has become a test of growing power and importance.'21 ... To
18 Colpoys v. Foreman, 163 F. 2d 908, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947): "Lawless invasion of
homes is the more menacing to a democratic society when it is committed by public officers."
19 Beach v. United States, 144 F. 2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
Yet Edgerton himself has demonstrated the paradox that at times a judge may be a
more effective instrument of democracy than the legislature. See his dissent in Barsky v.
United States, 167 F. 2d 241, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948), rehearing denied, 339
U. S. 971 (1950).
20 HoiDswoRTH, Soasx LEssoNs FROm OuR LEGAL HISTORY 13 et seq. (1928).
21 Citing CARDozo, THE NATURE or THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 73 (1937).
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let judges who lived and died in other times and places make our decisions
would be to abdicate as judges and serve as tellers. This court, like
every other American court, overrules its own decisions when need arises.
Decisions of other courts are not more binding on us.... This court's new
rule against new rules appears to mean that this court must take no part
22
in the development of the law.")

To appraise Judge Edgerton's opinions with regard to the remaining
two levels of precedent, it is necessary to recall the unique status of the
court upon which he sits.2 The District of Columbia has its own system
of local law.24 In this sphere the United States Court of Appeals for the
*District of Columbia Circuit performs a function akin to a state court
of last resort.25 Yet the court also operates within the national framework of the federal judicial system as an intermediate appellate court,
coordinate with the court of appeals in each of the other ten federal
circuits.&2 6 In one role, it acts as the high appellate tribunal for the
municipal courts of the District of Columbia and for the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in cases of a local nature.2 7
In the other, it hears appeals from the District Court in cases of a federal
nature2 8 and also, both directly or indirectly,29 is often called on to
22 Dissent in Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697, 699-700 (D. C. Cir. 1946). See
also Kay v. Cain, 154 F. 2d 305 (D. C. Cir. 1946).
23 "The court 'possesses the jurisdiction and power of Federal courts of the several
States, with such added jurisdiction as a State may confer on her courts'-Mr. Chief Justice
Taft in Public Utilities Commission v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 443. This
means that the jurisdiction of the court is broader than any circuit court of appeals or
any State supreme court." H.R. REP. No. 1628, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1930), Additional
Justices for the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. See also H.R. REP. No.
1748, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934), To Change the Name of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia.
24 DisTRicT oF CoLua&iA CoDa (1940 ed.).
25 "It is an appellate court for matters arising in the District of Columbia, just as the
Supreme Court of Utah is for matters arising in Utah, but this is only a part of its
jurisdiction . . ." H. R. REP. No. 1748, supra note 23. H. R. REP. No. 1628, supra note 23.
"This court possesses the usual jurisdiction of State appellate courts in litigation arising
in the District of Columbia; the jurisdiction of Federal circuit courts of appeal in Federal
matters; and the peculiar jurisdiction resulting from special acts of Congress. .. " SM. REP.
No. 847, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930), To Authorize the Appointment of Two Additional
Justices of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
SEN. REP. No. 917, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), To Change the Name of the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia.
See also 1 MooPe's FEDERAL PRvczcE §§ 0.06" and 0.07 (1938) and 3 Mooa 's FEDERAL
PRicn
§ 106.02 (1938).
26 See note 25 supra.
27 See note 25 supra.
28 See note 25 supra.
29 By virtue of its general equity jurisdiction and of various specific statutes.
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review the many national administrative agencies and boards which are
located in, and operate from, the District of Columbia.3 In either role,
the court's work may be subjected to Supreme Court review.
Stare decisis 1 . is the forbidding mien of the two remaining levels of
precedent with which Judge Edgerton's court must deal: the previously
decided cases of the court itself and the pertinent decisions of the Supreme
Court. A court of last resort may follow any of several courses in dealing
with a previously decided case cited as controlling authority." It may,
of course, adhere to the previous case. It may distinguish the case33 and
hold it inapplicable. It may pose a countering precedent,3 4 or it may
overrule the previous decision and announce a new rule 5
The dilemma of jurisprudence36 finds its nub in the open recognition
that stare decisis is not an invariable obligation of the common law judge.
It is understandable that some may feel that there is unfairness in a
practice which retroactively changes law without notice to those who have
relied upon the old rule. 7 Those who deem the judiciary the ministers
30 See note 25 supra.
31 "Judges march at times to pitiless conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic
which is supposed to leave them no alternative. They deplore the sacrificial rite. They
perform it, nonetheless, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the knife that they
obey the bidding of their office." CARozo, THE GROWTH or THE LAW 58, 66 (1939).
See also CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1937); Goodhart, Case Law
in England and America, 15 CORNEiLL L. Q. 173, especially 179 et seq. (1930); Cardozo,
The JudicialProcess Up To Now, note 32 infra; Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine
of Stare Decisis and the Extent To Which It Should Be Applied, 21 WASH. L. Rav. & ST. BAR
J. 158 (1946).
32 Cardozo, The Judicial Process Up To Now, 55 REP. N.Y. ST. BAR Ass'N 263 (1932),
reprinted uhder the title of "Jurisprudence" in HALL, SELECTED WRITINGS oF BaEujAIN
NATmAN CAuwozo 20 (1947); Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology,
62 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1289, 1300-1301 (1949).
33 Walton Hamilton, Judicial Process, 8 ENCYC. Soc. Scr. 450; Light, The Future Constitutional Opinions of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 17 CoRNELL L.Q. 541, 562 (1932); Felix S.
Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L. J. 238, 246 (1950).
34 See, for instance, PRTcHrr, THE RoosEvELT COURT 19-20 (1948): "However, from
the accumulation of one hundred and fifty years, precedents can be found to support
almost any judicial decision."
35 "1 think that when a rule, after it has been tested by experience, has been found
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with social welfare, there should be less hesitation
in the frank avowal and full abandonment." CARwozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCoSS
150 (1937) ; see also at pp. 158-160.
36 See Wormuth, The Dilemma of Jurisprudence,35 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 44 (1941).
37 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). Black,
J., declared at 647: "The argument for continuing the error of May v. Heiner is not on
the merits but is advanced in the alleged interest of tax stability and certainty, stare decisis
and a due deference of the just expectations of those who have relied on the May v.
Heiner doctrine." Burton, J., dissenting, declared at 698: "Since 1931, countless taxpayers
doubtless have relied upon and benefited by the interpretation announced in May v.
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of the law and not its masters urge that an element of caprice is introduced
into a system of law in which courts are free, even if only to a degree,
from the restraints of stare decisis. They affirm that judges do not make
law; they merely find and apply it.38 Can law be law, they ask, when
it is merely a prediction of what a judge or court will do?39
The answer has many prongs. Judges have made and do make law.4o
To deny this power to present-day judges, even if it were possible to do
so, would be to give the "judges who lived and died in other times and
places ' 141 precedence and control over the judges of the present and
future.4 2 Furthermore, since judges have "a roving commission to find
the just solution, ' 43 a degree of freedom from precedents which would
Heiner. They had no more right to such benefits than has the taxpayer in this case. If
the Government, after this reversal, issues regulations to relieve, in all fairness, settlors . . .
such special regulations will further emphasize the unique unfairness of enforcing the
present decision against the taxpayer in the instant case." See also FRANK, CouRTs ON
TAL 269-271 (1949); Cardozo, supra note 32, at 33-37; CARDozo, THE NATRE OF =
JUDICIAL PROCESS 145-148 (1937); MoRRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND mx SOCIAL ORDER 117
(1933); Roberts, J., dissenting, Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 128-130 (1940).
38 For discussions of this point of view, see Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean
Legal Thinking, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 568, 579-580, 582 (1932); FRAN:K, COURTS ON TRIAL
262-265 (1949); COHEN, LAW AND Tn SoCIAL. ORDER 242 (1933); Llewellyn, Law and the
Social Sciences-Especiallly Sociology, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1286, 1296 (1949).
39 Wormuth, supra note 36, at 50.
For other discussions of this question see Llewellyn, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology, 62 HA$v. L. REv. 1286, 1296 (1949); Radin, The Permanent Problems of
the Law, 15 CORNE. L. Q. 1, 15 (1929) ; Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. R!v.
457 (1897) ; CARuozo, Tnx GROWT3 or THE LAW 42 et seq., 52 (1939); FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND 48 (1930); COHEN, LAW AND ma SOCIAL, ORDER 242 (1933).
40 'Ve must urge upon judges that in their law-declaring function they are indeed lawmakers with the responsibilities for wise social engineering that rests upon all lawmakers."
Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HAgv. L. REv. 940, 956 (1923).
"The fiction that judges do not legislate has long since been abandoned by all who are
for a conscious and realistic jurisprudence." Laski, Judicial Review of Social Policy in
England, 39 HARv. L. REv. 832 (1926).
"The absence of an 'all fours' decision need not dismay us, however. There must always
be a first time for every legal rule. That is the way the law grows." Goodrich, J., Kroese
v. General Castings Corp., 179 F. 2d 760, 765 (3d Cir. 1950).
41 Edgerton, J., dissenting in Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697, 699-700 (1946).
42 "If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of
their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie in helpless submission the
hands of their successors." CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JuDmrAL PROCEss 152 (1937).
"... on the evidence, judge-made law is almost always concerned to slow down the
pace of change by adapting judicial results to a framework of principles the main explanation of which more often lies in the past, perhaps even in the distant past, than in the
problems of the contemporary scene." LAsts, THE AmEaIcAN DEmocRAcy 587-588 (1948).
43 Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive-The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929). CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCEss 10, 14-18, 69, 98-141, 165 (1937).
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work injustice is essential. 44 Justice, not symmetry or uniformity, is
the goal of the law.4 In any event, the judicial process, as exemplified
by our best judges, is not capricious; it would be more accurately
described as scientific, for it is premised upon a close examination of the
facts, both of the precedents and of the case to be decided, upon a
critique of the premises and logic of the precedents, especially in the
light of current conditions. The very life of the law depends upon its
ability to grow and develop to meet the changing needs of society with
justice. The change does not come suddenly or stealthily; it is usually
long heralded by insistent criticism and discussion.4" And often the only
practical, convenient or possible method of changing an erroneous or
outmoded rule of law embodied in a precedent is by another judge-made
rule.
It is against this background of contemporary thinking that the role
of precedent in Judge Edgerton's opinions should be appraised. In some
cases, even in the face of apparent hardship, he has adhered to controlling
precedent established by previous decisions of his own court47 On the
other hand Judge Edgerton follows, that is to say uses, precedent to
forward just results. He led a majority of the court to apply and even
extend a new precedent, not handed down until after the trial of the case
under consideration48 had been completed, but announced before the
argument of the appeal. Since the new precedent 49 had departed from
a previously established rule, the plaintiff had tried his case on an entirely
different theory. Judge Edgerton held that the plaintiff was entitled to
a new trial at which he could utilize the new precedent.
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor Judge Edgerton was con44 FRANK, COURTS ONeTRIAL 271 (1949); Douglas, Stare Decisis, 4 THE REcoRD or THE
Ass N or THE BAR or CITY or N.Y. 152, 166-167, 49 CoL. L. REv. 735, 746-747 (1949);
Cardozo, suzPra note 32; Frankfurter, J., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119, 121

(1940).
45 "Some judges give relatively great weight to symmetry and stability and so to the
sources of the rules they lay down. Others give relatively great weight to the effects of
their rules." Edgerton, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 63 Hanv. L. Rav. 293 (1949).
46 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). Black,
J., declared at 648: "Certainly, May v. Heiner cannot be granted the sanctuary of stare
decisis on the ground that it has a long and tranquil history free from troubles and
challenges."
Douglas, Stare Deciis, 4 THE REcoRD or =nn Ass'm or nmn BAR or Crry or N.Y. 152,
167 (1949), 49 CoL. L. Rav. 735, 747 (1949);
PRocEss 99 et seq., 178-179 (1937).

Chanozo, THE NATURE

or

a

JUDICIAL

47 Orlove v. National Savings & Trust Co., 98 F. 2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
48 Schaff v. R.W. Claxton, Inc., 144 F. 2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
49 Ross v. Hartman, 139 F. 2d 14, cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790, overruding Squires v.
Brooks, 44 App. D.C. 320 (1916).
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fronted with a ruling against which he had dissented in a previous appeal
in the same case and thus with a precedent which he had opposed in the
making. He declared: "I concur in the result only, on the ground that a
recent decision of this Court should not be overruled in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances." 5 0 On the other hand, while not departing
from this view, his dissent in Mays v. Burgess sought to avert the result
reached in a previous appeal in the same-case, also against his dissent,
not by proposing to overrule the prior decision but by the use of stare
decisis. The case was a suit in equity to enforce a racial covenant. He
declared: "The former decision of this court expressly left in effect the
rule of the Hundley case that a covenant of this sort will not be enforced
when, because the character of the neighborhood has changed, the
covenant can no longer accomplish its purpose and its enforcement would
probably depreciate the property- values which it was intended to
enhance."'" In In re Rice52 the refusal of the court, over Judge Edgerton's
protest, to follow precedent made one dent in the dam erected to prevent
economic chaos in our then war economy.
But the line of precedent is not always clear and unequivocal. In
Soffos v. Eaton,53 an action for malicious suit arising out of four successive suits, all unsuccessful, by the defendant against the plaintiff, the
court was confronted with a precedent 54 which held that no action for
malicious suit will lie if no arrest or attachment is involved. On the
other hand, the court had previously declared that "The right to litigate
is not the right to become a nuisance."5 5 As between these two principles,
Judge Edgerton chose relief for those who are badgered by successive
civil suits on a single claim.
Frequently the path to justice is unblocked by astute analysis of the
facts in the case and in the asserted precedent. In Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Co. v. Lewis,55 a suit for false arrest, the defendant urged that
the arrest was solely the act of police officers with no participation by
it other than identification of the plaintiff by an employee of the defendant who had accompanied the officers. Previous cases"' had established
6o 158 F. 2d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
51 Mays v. Burgess, 152 F. 2d 123, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
52 165 F. 2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
.3 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945). See also Orlove v. National Savings & Trust Co.,
98 F. 2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1938), for another example of choice of precedent.
54 Peckham v. Union Finance Co., 48 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
5 Melvin v. Pence, 130 F. 2d 423, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1942).

56 99 F. 2d 424 (D.C. 1938).
57 Prigg v. Lansburgh, 5 App. D.C. 30, 38 (1894); Waters v. Anthony, 20 App. D.C.
124 (1902) ; Kinchlow v. Peoples Rapid Transit Co., 88 F. 2d 764 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 693 (1937).
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that the mere giving of information is not a sufficient participation in an
arrest to impose liability. Judge Edgerton said: "If A tells B that X
carries a valuable watch, and B thereupon steals it, A does not necessarily
share B's guilt. That case may be assimilated to the 'mere information'
of the Prigg and Kinchlow cases."8 On the other hand if B, on receiving
A's information, tells A that B would like to steal the watch but does not
know X by sight, and invites A to accompany B in order to identify X
and thus enable B to rdb X, and this plan is carried out, A's guilt is
clear.... one who takes part in an unlawful act does not necessarily
escape responsibility by limiting his part to the identification of the
victim."

59

In the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee case, Judge Edgerton
dissented from the court's refusal to allow a suit for a declaratory
judgment and an injunction against the Attorney General and the Loyalty
Review Board. He distinguished a precedent,"0 which held an order of
the War Labor Board not subject to a similar suit, on the ground that
the War Labor Board's "views were not enforceable against anybody,
were .not defamatory, and caused no loss. The ruling now in suit is
defamatory; unless it is set aside, it is enforceable against appellant's
supporters who are government employees; and it has caused loss."'61
The critical point in the judicial process is the precedent "on all fours"
which blocks the just result; the precedent cannot be distinguished, nor
is there an alternative precedent. In such a case the court is faced with the
dilemma of adhering to an outworn and unjust rule or candidly overruling the obstructing precedent. The latter course is an open departure
from the common law doctrine of stare decisis and a frank revelation
of the major political fact that judges make and unmake law. Judge
Edgerton has recognized that in some cases this course is best.6"
In both Mays v. Burgess 3 and Hurd v. Hodge 4 the court faced the
58 See note 57 supra.
59 99 F. 2d 424, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
60 Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers v. National War Labor Board, 143 F. 2d
145 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944).
61 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F. 2d 79, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
rev'd, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Two oiler cases illustrate this technique: Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F. 2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Young,
134 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
62 Dissent in Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ; Ross v.
Hartman, 139 F. 2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943); cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944); Mullen v.
Canfield, 105 F. 2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
63 147 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868, rehearing denied, 325 U.S. 896

(1945).
64 162 F. 2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
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historic constitutional issue of the enforceability of racial covenants.
In 1924 Corriganv. Buckley' had set the court on the course of enforcing
covenants restricting realty on the basis of race. The United States
Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal taken as of right."8 In Mays v.
Burgess' the decision in fact turned on the attitude of the judges not
only toward the social and political problem of racial discrimination but
even more upon the binding effect of the Corrigan case. The majority
opinion held that "rights created by covenants such as these have been so
consistently enforced by us as to become a rule of property and within
the accepted public policy of the District of Columbia.'0 8 A concurring
opinion rested solely upon the precedents. 9 Dissenting, Judge Edgerton
declared: "Quite aside from the fact that our Corrigan case decision was
probably unsound when it was rendered, and the fact that it would not
cover this case even if general conditions in the District of Columbia
had remained the same, I think it is quite inapplicable today because
general conditions have not remained the same ....
If, as the majority
say, decisions of our court have determined these questions adversely to
appellants, we should overrule the decisions."70 Two years later, in
Hurd v. Hodge, Judge Edgerton, dissenting again from enforcement of
racial covenants, declared that his court's past decisions "were reached
without full consideration of the questions involved, are erroneous and
should be overruled.'
Stare decisis becomes most conclusive in the final category-the precedent of a "higher" court applicable to a case before a "lower" court of the
same jurisdiction. The precedent cannot be overruled, yet the result it
dictates may seem intolerable. Must the "lower" court then serve merely
as a conduit of "higher" court precedents for transferring them into
current cases even at the cost of justice? Is its creative activity confined
to molding the facts of a case within given principles? As an intermediate
65 299 Fed. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924), appeal dismissed, 271 U.S. 323 (1923).
66 299 Fed. 899 (D.C. Cir. 1924), appeal dismissed, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
67 147 F. 2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868, rehearing denied, 325 U.S.
896 (1945).
68 Groner, C. J., id. at 872.
69 Justin Miller, J., id. at 873.
70 Id. at 876, 878.
71 162 F.2d at 237 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
See also Franklin v. Franklin, in which Judge Edgerton spoke for a majority of the

court against a dissent which urged that the precedents were sound and should not be
overruled. Judge Edgerton held that precedents which "imply" that a court issuing an
equitable decree "lacks authority to apply equitable principles when asked to enforce pay-

ment of accrued installments [of alimony] under its own order . . . rest on a misunderstanding of the earlier cases and should be overruled."

171 F. 2d 12, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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appellate court the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit faces this issue in the precedents of the Supreme Court.
Judge Edgerton has recently said: "Some cases that reach appellate
courts seem to be covered by fairly clear and unanimous precedents, or
principles, that almost everyone accepts as either sound or harmless,"
but in other cases "Judges of equal technical competence reach opposite
results because there is no measure of the pertinence or the worth of
precedents and principles .... " This is the essence of his approach to
Supreme Court precedents.
When his court reversed on the facts a judgment of recovery for
personal injury based upon a jury verdict, Judge Edgerton pointed out
in dissent that "The Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed appellate
courts that overturned jury verdicts supported by evidence" 73 and declared, "This court's disregard of these principles in the present case goes
to the authority of the Supreme Court. . .

.

When the court disregarded 75 the Supreme Court mandate that persons
arrested for crime be arraigned without unnecessary delay, in the face
7
of a recent Supreme Court reversal of another of his court's cases,
Judge Edgerton, dissenting, called for adherence to Supreme Court
77

precedent.

Similarly in Bailey v. Richardson Edgerton dissented from a failure to
follow what he considered Supreme Court precedent. The issue was the
legality of a loyalty board's dismissal of a government employee and of
a three-year bar against her reemployment in the federal service. While
there was unanimity on the illegality of the bar to future employment,
the majority of the court upheld the dismissal. Judge Edgerton pointed
out that the Supreme Court in United States v. Lovett7 had nullified
dismissal by Congressional fiat of federal officials branded as disloyal.
"The Supreme Court held that their dismissals for supposed disloyalty,
'which stigmatized their reputation and seriously impaired their chance
to earn a living,' were equivalent to punishment for crime and therefore
could not be imposed by Congress or without judicial trial. .

.

. This

72 Edgerton, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 63 Hsswy. L. REV. 293 (1949).

73
74
U.S.
75

Citing as precedent Ellis v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 329 U. S. 649 (1947).
Capital Transit Co. v. Grimes, 164 F. 2d 718, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
845 (1948).
Garner v. United States, 174 F. 2d 499 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 945 (1949).
70 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, reversing 168 F. 2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
77 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), in which paralleling the facts in the

Garner case, supra note 75, secret continuous interrogation of youthful defendants for
several hours was held to constitute coercion sufficient to invalidate confessions.
78 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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court is deciding this case as if the Supreme Court had sustained the
attempt of Congress to dismiss Lovett and the others, denied their claims
to salaries, and awarded them nothing but an assurance that they would
be eligible for possible future appointments. . . . If the Court's words
had been inconsistent with its decision our duty would of course have
been to follow the decision, not the words. But they were not
inconsistent."79
One of the interesting facets of the two Busey opinions, both of which
Judge Edgerton wrote for the court, is his use of Supreme Court precedent.
Busey and his co-defendant were convicted of distributing Jehovah's
Witnesses magazines and collecting money on the streets of the District
of Columbia without paying the license tax required of all street vendors.
In the first Busey case,80 in the face of a dissent by Justice Rutledge, at
that time a member of the Court of Appeals, Judge Edgerton treated the
defendant's activity as the sale of magazines rather than the distribution
of religious propaganda, chose to rely upon Cox v. New Hampshire'1
in which a license tax on parades in general was upheld in its application
to a religious parade, 2 and distinguished two other Supreme Court
precedents which struck down a statute interfering with religious
contributions ss and invalidated a tax aimed at certain publications in
order to restrict their circulation 4 He wrote: ". . . requiring sellers
of religious magazines, along with all other street sellers, to pay a
reasonable license fee cannot be made an instrument to attack freedom
of the press or of religion. . . . We conclude that a reasonable
license fee, applicable to street sellers generally, and not intended or
shown to restrict the expression of any views, is valid in its application
to sellers of religious magazines."8 5 No doubt the decision was in part
the result of the impression of Supreme Court policy, generated by the
decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,8 that the legislative
power, exercised without apparent discrimination, would be sustained
even when enforcement of the law clashed with religious convictions.
79 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See also dissent in Mays v. Burgess, 152 F. 2d 123, 128
(D.C. Cir. 1945).
80 129 F. 2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1942), vacated and remanded, 319 U. S. 579 (1943).
81 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
82 129 F. 2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
83 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
84 Grosjeans v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
85 Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F. 2d 24, 27 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
88 310 U. S. 586 (1940). This impression appeared to be confirmed when two months
after Edgerton's first Busey opinion the Supreme Court decided the first Jones v. Opelika
case, 316 U. S. 584 (1942).
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But the Supreme Court remanded the Busey case for reconsideration
in the light of new Supreme Court decisions overruling the first Opelika
case.8 7 Upon the rehearing Judge Edgerton said: "The appeal has been
here before. When we decided it in April, 1942, the majority of this court
thought that decisions of the Supreme Court required us to hold the
statute valid. In cases from other jurisdictions which it decided two
months later, the Supreme Court not only confirmed that view but went
beyond it. .

.

. But the Chief Justice and three Associate Justices dis-

sented in those cases, and upon a change in the Court's membership in
February, 1943, it granted rehearings in them. Though no member of
the Court changed his position, the Court afterwards adopted the dissenting opinions which had previously been filed and reversed the state court
judgments which had previously been affirmed." 8 8 Judge Edgerton now
distinguished the Cox case8 9 by pointing out that the tax there was imposed upon all "parades and processions in order to meet the cost of
policing them," 90 while in the Busey case "it would be neither rational
nor convenient to presume that the uniform fee by which Congress
sought to cover the cost of policing all sorts of street sales happens not
to exceed the cost of policing the particular sort involved here. .

. .

No

presumption which lacks a probable basis in fact should be permitted
to conceal an interference with essential freedoms."91
Precedent, even when seemingly in point and as compelling as a
Supreme Court decision, is not an infallible guide to the "correct" or the
just decision. Even a judge with as sure an instinct for justice and the
right result as Judge Edgerton may be led astray by the apparent mandate
of past decisions, by an incorrect choice of available precedent, or by
the elusiveness or seeming insignificance of a fact such as that upon
which the reversal in the second Busey case turned.
In King v. United States Judge Edgerton was again confronted with
a seeming conflict of Supreme Court precedent. The case involved the
validity of a resentence of a prisoner which resulted in an increase in
kind and length of punishment. Judge Edgerton distinguished the precedent9 2 which would have upset the resentence and enabled the convict to
87 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).

Busey v. District of Columbia, 319 U.S.

579 (1943).
88 138 F. 2d 592, 593 (D. C. Cir. 1943).

89 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
90 Busey v. District of Columbia, 138 F.2d 592, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
91 Id. at 596. See Edgerton, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 63 HAv. L. Ray. 293, 295 (1949),
for a discussion of his change of view.
92 Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (U.S. 1873); United States v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304,
307 (1931).
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escape further punishment, and followed the one" which sustained the
resentence. Admitting the force in the considerations advanced against
his decision, he declared: "but as arguments for exercising judicial discretion in the prisoner's favor they must be addressed to the trial court,
and as arguments for a rule of law in his favor they must be addressed
to the Supreme Court or to Congress. ....""
In Shelley v. United States the court was confronted with a situation
not unlike that in the first Busey case. An expatriate American wife had
been denied the right to revive her citizenship because she insisted, on
the grounds of her religion and pacifism, upon excluding from her oath
of allegiance the promise to bear arms. Judge Edgerton declared: "In
1931, in United States v. Macintosh and United States v. Bland, the
Supreme Court held that the oath implied a promise to bear arms and
that a man or woman who would not make that promise could not be
naturalized. Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone joined Chief Justice
Hughes in dissenting; but in view of the recent flag salute case, we
cannot predict that the present Supreme Court will agree with them....
We must therefore follow-the Macintosh and Bland cases." 95
Judge Edgerton thus demonstrated two courses that may be followed
by a lower court faced with unpalatable precedent. If one can "predict"
from the more recent trend of higher court decisions that the precedent
in question would not be followed, it may be proper to refuse to follow
it." When this prediction cannot be made, the lower court by indicating
that attacks have been made upon the precedent from respected quarters
may encourage an appeal to the higher court for reconsideration of the
principle involved.
The foregoing cases illustrate the necessarily controlling effect of
Supreme Court precedent upon a lower court. Yet they also illustrate
the paradox that the declarations of a higher court need not always be
followed. Statements in an opinion which go beyond the facts of a case
'93 Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900).
94 King v. United States, .98 F. 2d 291, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
95 Shelley v. United States, 120 F. 2d 734, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1941). The Court, which
included Rutledge, J., was unanimous.
96 But see Hutcheson, J., RD-DR Corporation v. Smith, 183 F. 2d 562 (5th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950). See also Lawyers Service Letter No. 161 of the New
York State Bar Association 3 (Dec. 5, 1951), Paragraph entitled "Function of Lower Court,"
which contrasts the view of Frank, J., in Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F. 2 402, 408 (1949)
and in Perkens v. Endicott Johnson Corporation, 128 F.2d 208, 217-18 (1942) and of
Learned Hand, J., in Spector Motor Service v. Walsh, 139 F. 2d 809, 823 (1944) with the
view of Harrison, J., in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93 (1951).
The latter voices the same attitude as Hutcheson, J., in the RD-DR Corporation case cited
above in this footnote, which conflicts with the text of this article.
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or the bare logic of the decision are "dicta". A case in which a critical
fact differs from the case at bar may be "distinguished", i.e., not followed.
These are wise techniques that the common law has fashioned as an
antidote to the straight-jacket tendency of stare decisis. They are indispensable tools in the work of a judge who seeks to keep the law progressive with the needs of the entire community and the advancing concepts
of justice. Indeed the greatness of a judge may largely be measured by
his ability to sense critical areas in the law's development and the need
to navigate in these areas past the shoals of statements by a higher court.
This ability must encompass the perception to pierce the facts or logic
of the precedent to a point of distinction.
In the face of seemingly adverse Supreme Court authority, which
Judge Edgerton distinguished as dicta or not in point, he sustained the
right of a wife to sue her husband's co-tortfeasor;9 7 denied the power of
disbarment to inferior courts;", upheld the use of blood-grouping tests
in litigation of the issue of paternity;"' concurred in enlarging the concept of "doing business" as the basis of process against foreigu corporations; 1'0 and dissented from the exclusion of hospital records from the
"shop book" rule of evidence, 10 ' from the enforcement of racial restrictive
covenants in the use of realty," 2 and from the acceptance of government
employees as jurors in the prosecution of a communist. 10 3
The record of the Supreme Court's action in cases in which Judge
Edgerton either wrote the majority opinion, concurred specially or dissented, is a fair measure of the degree of his accuracy in his judgment of
the Supreme Court's views of the law." 4 Since he came to the bench he
97 Ewald v. Lane, 104 F. 2d 222 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 568 (1939).

98 Mullen v. Canfield, 105 F. 2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
99 Beach v. Beach, 114 F. 2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
'00 Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
101 New York Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1944, 1945).
102 Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F. 2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
103 Eisler v. United States, 176 F. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denie i, 337 U.S. 958 (1949).
But in Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950), a sharply divided Court ruled
against the position taken by Judge Edgerton. With Justices Douglas and Clark taking
no part in the consideration of the case, Justice Minton wrote the opinion in which three
of his colleagues concurred. Justice Jackson concurred in a separate opinion on the ground
that he still adhered to his dissent in the Frazier case but did not want an exception to the
rule of the Frazier case to be established solely for communists. Justice Reed, one of the
three concurring, declared that he interprets the Court's decision to mean that government
employees may be barred for implied prejudice as jurors "when circumstances are properly
brought to the court's attention which convince the court that Government employees
would not be suitable jurors in a particular case." 339 U. S. at 173. Justices Black and
Frankfurter each wrote a dissenting opinion.
104 The Supreme Court's views of the law, however, also vary from period to period
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has written 379 opinions."0 5 Of these, 108 or about 28% were brought to
the Supreme Court, i.e., petitions for certiorari were filed. In 29% of
06
these applications the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' Of the applica-

tions in cases in which he wrote the majority opinion certiorari was
granted in 13%. Of the applications in cases in which he dissented
certiorari was granted in 60%. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari
07
when Judge Edgerton wrote for
only 9 times and denied it 59 times
the court. On the other hand, when he dissented, the Supreme Court
0 8
There have been
granted certiorari 23 times and denied it 14 times'
as to many basic legal and constitutional policies. A judge who has correctly decided in
accordance with Supreme Court pronouncements of one period may find himself in conflict
with the Court in another period. It is now considered by some students of the Court that
its position on basic policy is in transitional stage. PamcHEvr, Tm ROOsEVELT COURT
xiv (1948) ; Dilliard, Truman's Supreme Court, 184 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 30 (Dec. 1949);
HowE, Justice in a Democracy, id. 34; Rodell, The Supreme Court is Standing Pat,
NEw REPuBLic 11 (Dec. 19, 1949).
-105 As of June 30, 1951. These do not include Per Curiam opinions of which Judge
Edgerton may have been the author. A complete appraisal should probably include all
cases in which Judge Edgerton sat but did not write or differ. But it is not possible to
measure the extent of his influence for the purpose of ascertaining the degree of success with
which his views met in the Supreme Court. He himself, in appraising the work of another
judge, the late Cuthbert W. Found of the New York Court of Appeals, has recognized
this difficulty:
"Still we do not know that Judge Pound influenced the law; for we do not know that
he influenced the decision of the case in which he wrote the opinion, unless that case was
decided by a bare majority of the court. No doubt many cases to which Pound's name
is attached would have been decided as they were if he had never sat upon the bench;
just as, conversely, he doubtless influenced the court's judgment in many cases in which
he did not write the opinion. ... Qualifications have been suggested even upon the proposition that a judicial opinion itself is the author's own. It has been suggested that only a
dissenting, or separately concurring, opinion truly represents its author, because in the
case of a majority opinion 'the decision, and usually the language, must ordinarily be
acceptable to the entire bench for whom the judge writes.' . . . He might have spoken
differently if he had not been engaged in finding formulae upon which four or more men
" Edgerton,
could agree; yet he may fairly be assumed to have meant what he said ...
A Liberal Judge: Cuthbert W. Pound, 21 CoRNELL L.Q. 7-8 (1935).
In applying these comments of Professor Edgerton to the work of Judge Edgerton, we
should note that in all but the few cases in which the court sat in banc the judge writing
the court's opinion had the task of "finding formulae upon which" not four or more men
but only one other could agree; but it is doubtful that this could be the basis of a deduction
that the opinion more completely represents the views of the judge who writes.
106 Thirty-two cases. A further caveat which should be appended to these statistics
is that the denial of certiorari is an ambiguous result; that it does not mean approval
by the Supreme Court of the decision below. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,
338 U.S. 912 (1950) ; Agaston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950).
307 This does not include the two cases in which Edgerton wrote separate opinions,
concurring in the result, in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
108 This does not include Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products Co., 160 F. 2d 295 (D.C. Cir.
1947), dismissed on motion of petitioner,331 U.S. 786 (1947), and one case not yet decided.
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3 affirmances and 4 reversals" 9 of judge Edgerton's majority opinions;
but in 22 of the 23 dissents reviewed by the Supreme Court there have
been 17 reversals of the decisions against which he voted.'
Balancing Interests

From Edgerton's earliest writings"' all through his more important
contributions to legal scholarship" 2 and continuing in his judicial
opinions there runs a deep vein of recognition that the contests and
controversies with which the law deals involve not only the parties themselves; behind the litigants stand social interests which the parties
exemplify and champion and which are contending for recognition and
supremacy. Again and again this point of view is frankly expressed.
This approach probably reflects the influence of Dean Roscoe
Pound," 3 under whom Judge Edgerton studied law at Harvard." 4
109 This does not include the remand in the Busey case.
110 As of June 30, 1951 one of the cases had not been decided. Judge Edgerton has
dissented in 62 cases. Of these review was sought in 38 cases [including Fleming v. Moberly
Milk Products Co., 160 F. 2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; petition for writ of certioraridismissed
on motion of counsel for petitioner, 331 U. S. 7861 and granted in 23.
III Edgerton, Value of the Service as a Factor in Rate Making, 32 HARv. L: REV.
516 (1919).
112 In his discussion of "legal cause" in torts, Edgerton had made a notable 'contribution
to the literature and theory of the law through his utilization of the principle of the
balancing of social interests. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 211, 343 (1924).
The importance of the article has been recognized. Cardozo in THE PAmno-zs OF LEGAL
SciENcE 85-86 (1928), states: 'Much of the discussion of proximate cause in case and in
commentary is mystifying and futile. There is a striving to give absolute validity to
doctrines that must be conceived and stated in terms of relativity. . . . I find the same
idea prefigured in an illuminating discussion by Professor Edgerton of the meaning of
legal cause. I do not say that I would follow him in all his conclusions as to the relative
function of judge and jury. For present purposes it is enough to mark the discernment and
understanding with which he penetrates to the heart and essence of the problem."
See also Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L. J. 238, 255 (1950),
in which Cohen states: "At least two great American judges, Benjamin Cardozo and
Henry Edgerton, have clearly recognized that in law, as elsewhere, judgments of causation
are essentially relative and purposive. . . . Probably the most precise formulation of the
value-orientation that is implicit in every judgment of causation is that given by Judge
Edgerton in his epochal article on 'Legal Cause'." See also Fleming and Perry, Legal Cause,
60 YA E L.J. 761, 775 (1951).
See also Edgerton, Book Review of Rationale of Proximate Cause by Leon Green, 29
CoL. L. REv. 229 (1929). Edgerton also applied the same principle in other fields of
law. Edgerton, CorporateCriminal Responsibility, 36 YALE L. J. 827, 837 (1927) ; Edgerton,
The Incidence of Judicial Control Over Congress, 22 CORNELL L. Q. 299 (1937).
113 Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. at 242-243, 348 (1924): "Usually, of
course, a court's conception of justice does not consciously involve a balancing of interests
such as Dean Pound has made familiar to his students."
114 He studied law at the Harvard Law School from 1911 to 1914, and practiced in
Boston from 1915 to 1916 and from 1918 to 1921.
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* Indeed Edgerton's work mirrors the critical process which judicial and
other legal writings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had
undergone. These writings had been increasingly criticized as conceptualistic and unrealistic. It had been pointed out that while judges appeared to be deciding cases on the basis of accepted, objective, lofty
principles,'15 they were in fact balancing, and giving unspoken preference
to, one social interest as against another."' Not only was the effect of
their decisions to extend to one group the support of the law's sanctions
but their opinions contained an unexpressed value judgment" 1 that one
social interest, in a given factual context, was to be preferred to others.
Open recognition that in many legal contests social interests were striving
for recognition against other social interests was considered by many an
advance in legal thinking, since it provided a more realistic basis for
legal principle!" Of this process of criticism, analysis, and appraisal,
Judge Edgerton's opinions are an outgrowth.
But the balancing of interests is vital and significant in Edgerton's
judicial work not because of historical perspective, but because it gives
content to certain general ideas with which, in his view, the law concerns
itself. We begin to see what he means by "justice" or the "just result"
and by "policy" or "public policy" when we understand which social
or public interests seem to him preponderant in given circumstances.
Judge Edgerton himself has pointed out that usually a court's conception
of justice "does not consciously involve a balancing of interests."" 9 In
115 See Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control Over Congress, 22 CORNLL L.Q.
299 (1937); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COL. L. R:ay. 809 (1935).
116 Edgerton, supra note 115; Braden, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YAl L.J.
571, 577 (1948).
117 CAmnozo, THE PARnoxFs OF LEGAL SCIENCE 75 (1928): "Constant and inevitable,
even when half concealed, is the relation between the legality of the act and its value to
society. We are balancing and compromising and adjusting every moment that we judge."
Learned Hand, Book Review, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1166-1167 (1930); FRAxn, COURTS
ON TRIAL 265 (1949) ; Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YA= L. J. 238,
259-266 (1950).
"1 Laube, The Jurisprudence of Interests, 34 ComqRLL L. Q. 291 (1949); Cohen, supra
note 117, at 259 et seq.
Jackson, J., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); Hughes,
C. J., Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Moma.s R. ConEw,
LAW AND TH SOCIAL ORDER 258 (1933) ; Cardozo, op. cit. supra note 117, at 52-75.
119 Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 343, 348 (1924).
Momus R. Conxn, LAW AnD THE SOCIAL ORDER 144 (1933), has made the same point in
criticism of our judicial system: "A judge looking only to the interests of the two parties
before him is apt to forget that his decision will affect countless others who are not present
and whose circumstances are not all identical. Human society is not so organized that a
dispute between A and B can be of no concern to anybody else."
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his own opinions the balancing is not always articulate. In some cases
it is expressed in terms of the interests of the parties themselves, and
not of the broader social interests which might be involved." But in
a number of cases Judge Edgerton expressly applies the balancing
principle and identifies the social interests.
Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, D.C., Inc.,
was a suit for damages arising out of nervous shock intentionally
caused by the dunning of a debtor by a collection agency. In sustaining
such a cause of action, Judge Edgerton declared that the correct rule
should be established "with a view to the social interests which seem to
be involved... For the sake of reasonable freedom of action, in our own
interest and that of society, we need the privilege of being careless
whether we inflict mental distress on our neighbors. It is perhaps less
clear that we need the privilege of distressing them intentionally and
without excuse.... The advantage to society of preventing such harm
seems greater than the advantage of leaving ill-disposed persons free to
seek their happiness in inflicting it."'' In Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins
a prospective bidder for a government contract sued to nullify a determination of a prevailing minimum wage rate and enjoin its incorporation
in the contract. The interest of business in obtaining government contracts, i.e., "to make money by dealing with the United States" is balanced
against the public interest not "to disturb the whole contracting system
of the government."' 122 In Eastburnv. Levin, an attractive nuisance case,
Judge Edgerton said: "On the one side is the occupant's interest, and
the general interest, in the profitable use of land. On the other is the
child's interest, and the interest of his parents and of society, in life and
limb and in compensation for their injury. Imposing responsibility is
more apt to make occupants careful than denying responsibility is to
Brownley v. Peyser, 98 F. 2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1938)-the interests of the creditors
of the subsidiary corporation as against the interests of the creditors of the parent corporation.
Webb v. Lohnes, 96 F. 2d 582, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 637 (1939)the right of an administrator to appeal from an order probating a lost will and superseding
him with an executor.
Leventhal v. District of Columbia, 100 F. 2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1938). "It must be
presumed that the rezoning which plaintiffs seek would actually inflict injury on the
owners and occupants of the other property in the neighborhood . . ."
Ewald v. Lane, 104 F.2d 222, 224 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 568 (1939)suit by wife against husband's co-tortfeasor. "If they were given immunity, they would
receive a windfall which they have done nothing to deserve. No interest would be served
except the interest of tort-feasors in escaping responsibility."
M21105 F. 2d 62, 64, 65 (D. C. Cir. 1939).
'22 Edgerton, J., dissenting in Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F. 2d 627, 645, 646 (D.C.
Cir. 1939), rev'd, 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
120
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make children careful; occupants may know little about law, but children
know nothing about it, and children will play where they can."'m In
Sweeney v. Patterson,a libel suit by a Congressman against a newspaper
publisher and a news commentator, Judge Edgerton affirmed dismissal
of the suit, declaring: "Since Congress governs the country, all inhabitants, and not merely the constituents of particular members, are vitally
concerned in the political conduct and views of every member of Congress.
Everyone, including appellees and their readers, has an interest to
defend, and any one may find means of defending it. The interest of
the public here outweighs the interest of appellant or any other individual.
The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but information. . . . Information and discussion will be discouraged, and the
public interest in public knowledge of important facts will be poorly
defended, if error subjects its author to a libel suit ....
"'
In United
States v. Public Utilities Commission, Judge Edgerton, dissenting from
affirmance of rates fixed by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, declared: "It is an error of law to ignore the interest
of the public in low rates. 'The rate-making process under the Act, i.e.,
the fixing of "just and reasonable" rates, involves a balancing of the
investor and the consumer interest.' The Commission's order does not
balance these interests."'z
But in the first Busey case 28 the principle of balancing interests found
its limitations. Judge Edgerton said that "Within wide limits, democracy
and the Constitution require freedom of expression and freedom of
legislation. We are asked to invade the second freedom in order, it is said,
to protect the first. It is not for us to say whether the license law is
good for the community. It is an Act of Congress." 2 This statement
intimates, at least, that the public interest in enforcement of the Bill of
Rights could be balanced against the public interest in vindicating the
legislative power, or more specifically, the power of taxation. But when

I=3 113 F.2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
124 128 F.2d 456, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 678 (1942).
12 158 F. 2d 533, 538-539 (D. C. Cir. 1946). The "balancing" approach also played a
part in the following cases: Thomas v. Murphy, 107 F. 2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; George's
Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Jillson v. Caprio, 181
F. 2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Soffos v. Eaton, 152 F. 2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945); dissent in
Dorsey v. Kingsland, 173 F. 2d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 338 U.S. 318 (1949), rehearing
denied, 338 U.S. 939 (1950).
126 Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F. 2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1942), vacated and remanded,
319 U. S. 579 (1943) ; 138 F. 2d 592 (D. C. Cir. 1943).
127 Id. at 28. But Edgerton went on to say: "Though it covers some sales of religious
literature, it conflicts with no defensible concept of the constitutional freedom of the press
or of religion."
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the Supreme Court had remanded the case for reconsideration,'8 Judge
Edgerton concluded that "Freedoms of speech, press, and religion are
entitled to a preferred constitutional position because they are 'of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.' They are essential not only
to the persons or groups directly concerned but to the entire community.
Our whole political and social system depends upon them. Any interference with them is not only an abuse but an obstacle to the correction
of other abuses."' 29
This view became his fixed star of decision in Bill of Rights cases. If
there was to be any balancing of interests in these cases, the scales were
to be heavily weighted in favor of liberty. In Barsky v. United States,
involving a conviction of officers and directors of the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refuge Committee for contempt of the Un-American Activities Committee, Judge Edgerton, dissenting from affirmance, reiterated the preferred position of the public interest in upholding the Bill of Rights,
and at the same time declared that as to "Investigation in general, and
this investigation in particular ... There is no basis in authority, policy,
or logic for holding that it is entitled to a preferred constitutional
position."'"" When a defendant claims the protection of the Bill of
Rights, as in the Barsky case, "The problem is not, as the court suggests,
that of balancing public or social interests against private interests.
'The principle on which speech is classified as lawful or unlawful involves
the balancing against each other of two very important social interests,
in public safety and in the search for truth ....
Imprisonment of "halfbaked" agitators for "foolish talk" may often discourage wise men from
publishing valuable criticism of governmental policies. . . . The great
interest in free speech should be sacrificed only when the interest in
public safety is really imperiled . ., "1" In Bailey v. Richardson,132 dissenting from affirmance of a loyalty board dismissal of an employee,
Judge Edgerton declared: "The court thinks Miss Bailey's interest and
'1 Id. at 24.
129 138 F. 2d 592, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1943). But see American Communications Ass'n, CI.O.
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). The trend of the Douds case was confirmed in Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951), in which it was stated: "An analysis of the leading
cases in this Court which have involved direct limitations on speech, however, will
demonstrate that both the majority of the Court and the dissenters in particular cases
have recognized that this is not an unlimited, unqualified right, but that the societal value
of speech must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations."
130 167 F. 2d 241, 253, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948), rehearing

denied, 339 U.S. 971 (1950).
131 Id. at 258, quoting from CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN mx UNITED
(1941).
1:32 182 F. 2d 46, 74 (D. C. Cir. 1950). See note 79 supra.
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the public interest conflict. I think they coincide. Since Miss Bailey's
dismissal from a nonsensitive job has nothing to do with protecting the
security of the United States, the government's right to preserve itself
in the world as it is has nothing to do with this case. The ominous
theory that the right of fair trial ends where defense of security begins
is irrelevant. . . We have no reason to suppose that an unpatriotic
person in her job could do substantial harm of any kind. Whatever her
actual thoughts may have been, to oust her as disloyal without trial is to
pay too much for protection against any harm that could possibly be
done in such a job. The cost is too great in morale and efficiency of
government workers, in appeal of government employment to independent and inquiring' minds, and in public confidence in democracy.
But even if such dismissals strengthened the government instead of
weakening it, they would still cost too much in constitutional rights.
We cannot preserve our liberties by sacrificing them." 1a
Economic, Social and PoliticalIssues
The foregoing opinions begin to indicate Judge Edgerton's standard
of values in the balancing process-what interests tend to outweigh what
others. These values give content to the concept of justice. Justice seen
from one side of the tracks may be different from justice seen from the
other side. The mettle, the orientation, the basic drive of a judge are
revealed by whether he favors the public interest over a private or
special interest, whether the welfare of the community prevails over
other claims. But it is not easy to say in every case in which direction
the public interest is touched. No one individual, group, agency nor
even government is invariably found on the side of what any other individual regards as the higher social or public interest.
Judge Edgerton began his judicial service during the New Deal, when
the nation was still struggling to overcome the effects of the Great
Depression. Then came the pre-war emergency, the war years, and the
post-war period. Each episode in the panorama sprouted its configuration
of social, economic and political problems, which in one form or another
were bound to come before the courts. In many cases the public interest
133 Ibid. See also Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 161 F. 2d 380,
385 (D.C. Cir. 1947), aff'd, 333 U.S. 437 (1948), in which in a somewhat analogous field
-involving one of labor's basic charters, the Norris-LaGuardia Act-udge Edgerton, dissenting from the court's refusal to hold the Act applicable, declared that the court's "theory
is that there is no labor dispute unless the court thinks the interests [the employees] seek
to promote are 'legitimate' and are more important, on balance, than the conflicting interests
of the plaintiffs. . . . But the Act says nothing about the legitimacy of objectives or the
balancing of confficting interests."
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was clearly arrayed against a private or special interest, and in some of
these it was not a matter of one being right and the other wrong. The
desperate necessity of keeping the nation's economy on an even keel in
the midst of the life-and-death struggle with the fascist powers made it
imperative that price control violations, unwitting or not, be prevented.
"'Innocent non-conformity with the Price Control Act is as inflationary
and as damaging to competitors and the public as guilty non-conformity.'
• . . Section 205(e) reflects the view that occasional hardship to one
who honestly and intelligently endeavors to comply with the law is not
too high a price to pay for the protection of the whole community
against inflation." 3 4
An indictment for violation of the anti-trust laws charged that a milk
producers association, controlling 80 percent of the milk sold in the
Washington metropolitan area, had conspired to suppress competition,
fix prices, and control the quantity of milk put on the market. Judge
Edgerton held that these practices were not sanctioned by any of the
laws granting special status to agricultural producers' 3 5 In another
decision, which the Supreme Court reversed, he took the rareP8 course
of overruling an order of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Sugar
Act, because the quotas it fixed for refined sugar to be imported from
Puerto Rico favored the largest and oldest Puerto Rican refining companies and gave little weight to the growth of smaller companies during
the war and post-war years. The effect of his decision would have been
to loosen the grip of entrenched interests in the sugar industry and to
stiffen the competition from the refiners who had expanded their plants
since 1941.
In Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug a company mining coal on
leased public lands sought to nullify a lease of public coal lands to a
competitor, by invoking a government regulation restricting the leasing
of public coal lands. Apparently the purpose of the new lease was to
134 Bowles v. American Stores, Inc., 139 F. 2d 377, 378, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U. S. 730 (1944).
'-35 United States v.

Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 179 F. 2d 426 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 831 (1949).
136 Central Roig Refining Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 171 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir.
1948), rev'd, 338 U.S. 604 (1949). It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
who wrote the majority opinion for reversal, nevertheless agreed with Judge Edgerton, who
was in the minority on this question in his own court, that the issue of the constitutionality
of the Sugar Act should be decided. Mr. Justice Black dissented from the reversal and
stated he "would affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia for the reasons given in that court's opinion." 338 U. S. at 620.
See infra pp. 188-92 for judge Edgerton's views in the field of administrative law.
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permit "the expansion of an existing mine, which is running out of coal
reserves." The effect of the action of the Secretary of Interior in leasing
to plaintiff's competitor was to maintain salutary competition in that
part of the coal industry. Judge Edgerton dissented from the court's
decision which permitted the maintenance of a suit to enjoin the
Secretary. 137 On the other hand, the consideration of competition was
not, deemed a sufficient basis for overturning the Federal Communications Commission's refusal to license the Mackay interests to operate
a direct public radiotelegraph service between Long Island and Norway,
in competition with the R. C. A. group. Judge Edgerton held that the
Federal Communications Commission had power to refuse the license
even if it meant the creation of a communications monopoly between
the points in question."3 8
In some cases the broader public issue is not evident on the face of
the case. The faculty of a judge to discern it affects his ability to render
justice. In Wolpe v. Poretsky the spot rezoning of a single small plot
from apartment house to separate residence use was in issue. Judge
Edgerton held, "Appellee's proposed apartment building will accommodate many more people than the single dwellings which might be built
on the lot.... Even apart from the housing shortage, it [the order of the
Zoning Commission] would have borne no positive relation to the public
welfare and would have been arbitrary and unreasonable. In view of the
acute housing shortage it bore a negative relation to the public
welfare."' 8 9
In Potomac Electric Power Company v. Public Utilities Commission
public utility regulation and rates were the issue. In 1924 a consent decree
had fixed the value of the company's property at a stated amount and the
fair rate of return at 7Y2 %. In the event that earnings in any year
exceeded the fair rate a sliding scale for reduced utility rates in subsequent years was provided until the excess earnings were absorbed. In the
nineteen years that followed, the company nevertheless piled up excess
earnings in the aggregate sum of $16,000,000, and in each of these years
but one the rate of return exceeded the fair rate fixed in the consent
decree. In 1944 the Commission ordered the company to file new rate
137 Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., Inc. v. Krug, 172 F. 2d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd,
338 U. S. 621 (1950).

For another case prompted by the desirability of competition, see Southern Railway Co.
v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 124 F. 2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1941). Rutledge, J., concurred; Vinson,
J., dissented.
138 Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission, 97
F. 2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
139 154 F. 2d 330, 331 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U. S.724 (1946).
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schedules, reducing its gross operating revenues. The Commission's
order would give the common stock a return, after all expenses and
charges, of $3,250,000 for their current year. In affirming this order to
reduce electric rates Judge Edgerton declared that "This would be, as
the Commission observes, 8.91 percent of the 'common-stock equity'.
It would also be, as the Commission does not observe, some 36 percent
of the par value of the common stock and some 60 percent of the amount
which the Company received for the stock and invested in plant. The
Commission says that the proposed return, in its opinion, will enable
the Company 'to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and
to compensate its investors for the risks assumed.' This is understatement if not irony. The risks, if any, are as small as the human mind can
conceive. The return is enormous."' 140
In Philadetphia Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission
enforcement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act by the Commission was sustained. The Commission ordered a holding company to
dispose of the gas and transportation interests which it had combined
with its electric utility system, and to dissolve. The Commission determined that the electric and gas utilities were essentially competing
interests. Judge Edgerton affirmed this decision. He sustained the Commission's finding that the transportation system was not incidental or
necessary to the electric utility system and that common control of the
two was not " 'necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors or consumers and not detrimental to the proper
functioning of such system or systems.' ,,"
In East Ohio Gas Co. v. FederalPower Commission' Judge Edgerton
dissented from a decision that excluded from the controls of the federal
Natural Gas Act a gas company which operated wholly within the State
of Ohio but drew 85 percent of its gas from outside the state through
its own high pressure lines.
Basic controls in the national banking system were involved in two
cases that came before Judge Edgerton. In both he dissented from his
140 158 F.2d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 816 (1947). Judge Clark
concurred specially and Judge Wilbur K. Miller dissented. Cf. with Edgerton's earlier views
on the subject. Edgerton, Value of the Service as a Factor in Rate Making, 32 HARv. L.
Rav. 516 (1919). See also note 125 supra and note 232 infra, for Edgerton's dissent in
the companion case of United States v. Public Utilities Commission, 158 F.2d 533 (1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 816 (1947), in which he protested against including in'the rate base
a surplus created out of excessive rates.
141 177 F. 2d 720, 725 (D.C. Cir 1949).
142 173 F. 2d 429 .(D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 338 U. S. 464, rehearing denied, 339 U. S.
905 (1950).
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court's refusal to sustain the regulatory action of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In both dissents he was sustained
by the Supreme Court.143
When mass unemployment and wholesale loss of purchasing power
were still a fresh experience and the national emergency, which was the
prelude to the war, was upon us, the nation's welfare and its very safety
hinged upon government policies designed to maintain the stability of
the economy. This objective inevitably included maintenance of the
living standards of the working population at decent levels. To do its
part, the government adopted the statutory policy of requiring its contractors furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to pay their employees at least those wages which the Secretary of Labor found to be
"'the prevailing minimum wages... in the locality in which the materials,
supplies,... or equipment are to be manufactured." Secretary of Labor
Perkins had found that the prevailing minimum rate in the iron and
steel industry for the northeastern section of the country was 622 cents
an hour. The Lukens Steel Company and a group of smaller steel companies in the industries affected brought suit to nullify the determination
of the Secretary. They contended that the correct prevailing minimum
wage rates were from 5231 cents to 562 cents an hour. The majority
of the court sustained this contention. Judge Edgerton, dissenting, voted
for the right of government to play its part, free from judicial interference
at the instance of special groups, in maintaining wage levels.144
With the coming of war, new issues involving labor arose. The rights
of labor, including the right to strike, had to be preserved if the war
against fascism was to mean anything. Yet the war effort required the
settlement of labor's demands without interruption of production. To
meet this problem the War Labor Board was created. In two important
efforts by employers to attack the decisions of the War Labor Board
Judge Edgerton refused to sanction interference with the Board's
1
work. m
To maintain the war effort, the battle to control inflation also had to
be won. The instrument of national policy on this front was the Office
of Price Administration. In Brown v. Hecht Company, a suit by the
143 Agnew v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 153 F. 2d 785 (D.C.
Cir. 1946), rev'd, 329 U.S. 441 (1947); Peoples Bank v. Eccles, 161 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir.
1947), rev'd, 333 U. S. 426 (1948).
144 Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F. 2d 627, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1939), rev'd, 310 U.S.
113 (1940).
145 Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. National War Labor Board, 143
F. 2d 145, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944) ; National War Labor Board v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 144 F. 2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944).
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0,P.A. Administrator to enjoin price control violations, Judge Edgerton,
in a decision with which the Supreme Court did not agree, held that at
the suit of the 0. P. A. the issuance of an injunction by the court was
mandatory. 1 46 In an undeviating series of opinions, he maintained the
crucial public interest in holding the price line-in preventing erosion of
the powers of the 0. P. A. and its successors and in maintaining efficiency
of the government's price control machinery. He sustained penalties
against unintentional violators of price ceilings and refused to permit
He
these penalties to be whittled down to mere nominal amounts."
construed the 0. P. A.'s powers of allocation to include the power to
suspend violators of the rationing regulations from all business activity.14
He recognized as a price control violation the sale to a customer in one
price class above ceiling prices fixed for that class although the increased
prices were within the ceilings fixed for customers of another class.'49
He concurred in the affirmance of a conviction for price control violations,
taking pains to write a special opinion favoring the admissibility of evidence obtained by searching the voluntary prosecution witness before
and after the purchase to establish the amount paid by the witness for
the article sold by the violator above ceiling pric. ° Even though the
"Price Control Act ...does not expressly authorize delegation of any

power of the Administrator," he held that the O.P.A. administrator
could delegate his subpoena powers. "Obviously he must delegate most
of his functions if they are to be performed at all."'' He dissented from
from
affirmance of a judgment enjoining the O.P.A. administrator 52
enforcing his plan of allotment of sugar for industrial nonwar use1
During the war, it was to be expected that in one form or another
fascism and its viruses, racism and anti-semitism, would receive the
attention of the courts. Judge Edgerton refused the sanction of libel
146 137 F. 2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1943), rev'd, 321 U. S. 321 (1944).

147 Bowles v. American Stores, Inc., .139 F. 2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322
U. S. 730 (1944).
148 L. P. Steuart & Bros., Inc. v. Bowles, 140 F. 2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 322 U.S. 398
(1944).
149 ".. . it has been urged that low rates to favored customers should disappear because
the competitive conditions which produced them have disappeared. As an economic argument,
this attacks the whole theory and purposi of price regulation, which are to prevent changes
in competitive conditions from producing the price increases which they would produce in
the absence of regulation." Rainbow Dyeing & Cleaning Co. v. Bowles, 150 F. 2d 273,
274 (D. C. Cir."1945).
150 Silverfarb v. United States, 151 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
161 Raley v. Porter, 156 F. 2d 561-562 (D.C. Cir. 1946), aff'd, 331,U.S. 111 (1947).

162 Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products Co., i160 F. 2d 259 (D.C. Cir.), petition for
writ of certiorari dismissed on motion of counsel for the petitioner, 331 U. S. 786 (1947).
See also United States v. Seigel, 168 F. 2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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against a newspaper and its columnist who had charged anti-semitism
to a Congressman 5 3 and against a Congressman who had labeled a
newspaper "a Nazi Trojan Horse.' 5 4 In another libel suit against a
newspaper publisher, by the author of a book, he affirmed a judgment
dismissing the suit, based upon a jury's verdict that the plaintiff was
in fact the "author of a defeatist, anti-Jewish book." Judge Edgerton
held: "The contents of the book, which are in the record, sufficiently
support the jury's verdict. Since that is the case, the Post's opinion
that the book was defeatist as well as anti-Jewish was at least a reasonable
opinion . . ."'
He dissented from the dismissal of the indictments
of the alleged American fascist leaders" 6 and sustained the eviction
of one of the defense lawyers from the case for contempt of court in
seeking to enlist congressional pressure againt the trial judge. 57 He
saw that racial discrimination at home and especially against the Negro
could not be reconciled with the war against the avowed exemplar of
racism abroad. In the first racial restrictive covenant case to come before
him he declared that "Requiring Negroes to live according to their common color instead of their individual capacities hampers the war effort
... ,"158In his second racial restrictive covenant case he said: "The Charter
of the United Nations provides that 'the United Nations shall promote...
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race...' and that 'all Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action' for that purpose.
... America's adherence to this Charter, the adherence of other countries
to it, and our American desire for international good will and cooperation
cannot be neglected in any consideration of the policy of preventing men
from buying homes because they are Negroes. In many countries the
color of a man's skin is little more important than the color of his hair
and in many others the favored color is not white. In western Europe,
to say nothing of other parts of the world, the position of Negroes in
America is widely advertised and widely resented."' 5 9
1 Sweeney v. Patterson,'128 F. 2d 457 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942).
U54 Potts v. Dies, 132 F. 2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 762 (1943).
16 Sullivan v. Meyer, 141 F. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944).
156 United States v. McWilliams, 163 F. 2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1947).

157 Laughlin v. Eicher, 145 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 866 (1945).
This case was heard in banc, with Judges Thurman Arnold and Justin Miller voting with
Judge Edgerton, and Chief Judge Groner and Judge Stephens dissenting.
158 Dissent in Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869, 877 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
868, 896 (1945).
159 Dissent in Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F. 2d 233, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 24

(1948).
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Rights of Labor
Before he became a judge, Edgerton declared: "A liberal judge has
a heterodox picture of a good society. When he is called upon to determine
where the balance of social advantage lies, he allows less weight than
is orthodox to the interests of the propertied, enterprising, and employing
classes, and more weight than is orthodox to the interests of the propertyless and working classes." 160
Since he came to the bench Judge Edgerton has written opinions involving collective bargaining, the right to organize, standards of pay,
picketing and the right to strike, and workmen's compensation. In these
cases he has expressed, in terms, no general philosophy. His results are
favorable to the interests of workingmen.
During a period when the interpretation and enforcement of the
National Labor Relations Act was evolving, he sustained orders of the
Labor Board requiring discontinuance of unfair labor practices by employers' 61 and compelling reinstatement of employees who complained
they had been discharged for union activity.6 2 He dissented from a
partial reversal of an NLRB decision finding unfair labor practices committed by an employer.1"' After the establishment of the War Labor
Board during World War II, he held that proceedings to enforce an
NLRB order against an employer for failure to' engage in collective
bargaining with a union had not been supplanted by proceedings before
the War Labor Board. 61' He also refused to enjoin action threatened by
the War Labor BoardVe In a case involving a jurisdictional dispute
between railroad unions he sustained a broader industrial, rather than
a narrower craft, basis for determining a collective bargaining unit.'
When an employer in the District of Columbia attempted to enjoin a
union under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act from conducting a strike
aimed at preventing importation of baked goods from Philadelphia shops
160 Edgerton, A Liberal Judge: Cuthbert W. Pound, 21 CoRNFXx L. Q. 7, 12 (1935).
161 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 120 F. 2d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1941) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Arcade-Sunshine Co., 118 F. 2d 49 (D.C. Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 567 (1941).
162 National Labor Relations Board v. Willard, Inc., 98 F. 2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
163 Schweitzer, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 144 F.2d 520, 526 (D.C. Cir.

1944).
164 National Labor Relations Board v. National Laundry Co., 138 F. 2d 589 (D.C. Cir.

1943).
165 National War Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 144 F. 2d 528 (D.C.
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 774 (1944).

166 Order of Railway Conductors of America v. National Mediation Board, 113 F.2d
531 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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which maintained lower wage scales, Judge Edgerton held that the
union's aim was not an anti-trust law violation and that, moreover,
peaceful picketing could not be prohibited under the Sherman Act." 7
Dissenting from an affirmance of an injunction obtained by an employer
against a union, he urged that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited
issuance of the injunction. 6 s
In various aspects of the problem, Judge Edgerton has sustained
efforts to protect or improve wage standards. His position in the important Lukens case" 9 has already been noted. He upheld the Wage and
Hours Administrator's ruling which placed certain base metal workers
in the higher wage category of the jewelry industry.' ° He refused to
disturb a War Labor Board award of wage increases. 71 ' He sustained the
rights of certain government employees in the Customs service to overtime
pay. 2 He dissented from a decision giving super-seniority rights under
the Veterans Preference Act to temporary members of the Coast Guard
Reserves during World War II, declaring that such preference would
weaken the competitive position of other war workers and of veterans.'
The social purpose of Workmen's Compensation has been given full
effect in Judge Edgerton's opinions. In Maryland Casualty Company v.
Cardillo, in which he sustained recovery by the widow of a collection
agent who died of injuries received when he was assaulted and robbed
after business hours while returning to his office with his collection
"book" in his hand, Judge Edgerton expressed the keynote of his decisions
in this field :171 "If a man's employment exposes him to special risk
of attack not only during working hours, but during certain off hours also,
it is as socially desirable that the industry carry the off-hour risk as that
it carry the working-hour risk. Both alike are hazards of the industry.
Moreover, compensation acts 'should be consttued liberally in furtherance
of the purpose for which they were enacted and, if possible, so as to
167 Gundersheimers, Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers International Union, 119
F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
'168 Dissent in Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 161 F. 2d 380, 384

(D.C. Cir. 1947), aff'd, 333 U.S. 437 (1948).
169 Dissent in Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F. 2d 627, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1939), rev'd,
310 U.S. 113 (1940), discussed, pp. 175 supra.
170 Art Metal Workers v. Walling, 129 F. 2d g0 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
171 Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers v. National War Labor Board, 143 F. 2d
145 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944).
172 Callahan v. United States, 122 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
173 Dissent in Mitchell v. Cohen, 160 F. 2d 915, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 333 U.S.
411 (1948).
174 107 F. 2d 959, 961-962 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
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avoid incongruous or harsh results'."'7
The Constitution

In each era the Constitution must be reinterpreted and expounded in
terms of the problems and aspirations of the day 6 A judge cannot
perform this task solely by the application of settled authority.17 7 In
this field perhaps more than any other a judge's course reflects his views
as to the most desirable solution of the problems before him.178
Judge Edgerton appears to have steered for himself, and at times for
his court, a course between two constitutional purposes: strengthening
the hand of government so that it may better serve the people while at
the same time preserving the fundamental safeguards of human freedom.
On the one hand he maintained that "the Constitution does not require
that a rationing program which is at least a reasoned attempt to comply

with the law shall be subjected to judicial review.,"

79

In another case

he would have strengthened the Federal Communications Commission,
175 Accordingly Judge Edgerton has liberally construed the Workmen's Compensation
Act in the following cases- Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, 99 F.2d 432 (1938)commissioner may reconsider and reverse own prior decision denying award; Cardillo v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 101 F. 2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1938)-medical expenses may be awarded
in addition to statutory maximum amount; Associated General Contractors of America,
Inc. v. Cardillo, 106 F. 2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1939)-requirement of corroboration of deceased
workman's statement as to the injury liberally construed; Potomac Electric Power Co. v.
Cardillo, 107 F. 2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1939)--statute of limitations held to run not from date
of accident but from time effect is felt; Avignone Freres, Inc. v. Cardillo, 117 F.2d 385
(D.C. Cir. 1940)-award sustained for death caused by slight injury aggravating worker's
diabetic condition; Cardillo v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 109 F. 2d 674 (D.C.
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 699 (1940)-bus driver's deviation from route for lunch
no bar'to recovery; Penker Construction Co. v. Cardillo, 118 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
-award for death caused by assault by fellow employee arising out of a personal dispute.
176 Cuthbert W. Pound, A Modern University Law School, 18 CORNELL L. Q. 7, 18-19
(1932); William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COL. L. REv. 735, 754 (1949).
177 C~ARozo, THE NATURE OF TH JUDICIAL PROCESS 17 (1937): "Above all in the field
of constitutional law, the method of free decision has become, I think, the dominant one
today. The great generalities of the Constitution have a content and significance that vary
from Age to Age." See also William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COL. L. REv. 735, 737
(1949); William 0. Douglas, The Dissenting Opinion, 8 LAWYERS GUILD REvixw 467, 468
(1948); Bernhardt, Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional Issues, 34 CORNELL L. Q.
55 (1948); Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to
Which It Should Be Applied, 21 WAsH. L. REv. & BAR JR. 158 (1946); Radin, The Trail
of the Calf, 32 Copmr
L.Q. 137 (1946).
178 Cardozo, The Judicial Process Up to Now, An Address at the Fifty-fifth Annual
Meeting of the New York State Bar Association, Jan. 22, 1932, 55 REPm.N.Y. ST. BAR Ass'N
263 (1932). The mimeographed copies of this address carried the foregoing title. Reprinted
under the title "Jurisprudence" in HALL, SELECTED WaRIeNs oF BExNjtiN NATAN CawDozo
7 (1947).
'79 Dissent in Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products, 160 F.2d 259, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1947),
note 17 supra.
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which had granted increased broadcasting time and power to a radio
station. From a reversal of the Commission's order because the Commission had denied a hearing to a competing station, Judge Edgerton
said in a dissent which the Supreme Court did not sustain: "The
Constitution does not, in my opinion, give appellant a right to a
full hearing, of the trial type, in the proceedings before the Commission.
... Since the Commission had to decide primarily a question of policy
and only incidentally a question of fact, the technique of a trial would
have been clumsy and wasteful." s0 He sustained a District of Columbia
tax based upon the taxpayer's gross receipts despite the fact that the
taxpayer's business was "carried on outside as well as inside the District"
and involved "the exploitation of land" outside the District.'
He
sustained the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission to control
the exploitation of the water power of a stream which "is now capable of
navigation, in broken stretches, by boats of a sort."' 8 2 Other decisions
give adhesive power" to the cement which the "full faith and credit"
clause was intended to supply to "weld the independent tates into a
84
nation."
But as already pointed out,"s the Busey case had demonstrated that
even as fundamental a power as the taxing power was limited by the
civil liberties provisions of the First Amendment. Judge Edgerton's experience in that case l 6 became a touchstone for him in civil liberties cases.
He constantly uses and cites the Busey case,' 8 7 and the Supreme Court
cases which caused its reversal, in important opinions in which Judge
180 Dissent in National Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 132
F.2d 545, 567-568 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943). Rutledge, J., wrote the
principal opinion in the Court of Appeals. Groner, C.J., and Vinson and Stephens, IJ.,
concurred in the result. In a subsequent case, involving the Federal Communications Commission's power to dispense with oral argument, in which Judge Edgerton voted with the
minority to sustain such power, the Supreme Court upheld this dissent in an opinion by
Rutledge, J., FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949), reversing 174 F. 2d 226, 243 (1948).
181 Cedar Hills Cemetery Corp. v. District of Columbia, 124 F. 2d 286, 287 (D.C. Cir.
1941).
182 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 123 F. 2d 155, 162
(D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 806 (1942).
183 Junghans v. Junghans, 112 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Miller v. Miller, 122 F. 2d
209 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
184 See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951).
185 See pages 161-62, 169 supra.
186 See pages 161-62, notes 80-91 supra.
187 See dissents in Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948), rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 971 (1950); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F.2d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 341 U.S. 123 (1931);
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an evenly divided Court,
341 U.S. 918 (1951).
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Edgerton has sought to give unstinted effect to the constitutional restraints
imposed upon government in the interest of freedom.
Of course, positive governmental action to promote the welfare of the
= 88 In certain areas
nation is also essential to the promotion of freedom.
of activity the advancement of freedom requires that the legislative or
executive branches of government t6 be free from judicial restraints.
The other side of the coin is the traditional set of restraints contained
in the Constitution, and especially in the Bill of Rights, to guarantee
individuals, groups and the nation itself against the abuse of governmental power.
Negro Rights: The Constitution has catalogued threats to liberty in
such historic formulae as "without due process of law," "unreasonable
searches and seizures," "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government," "deny the... equal protection of the laws," "self-incrimination." The most pressing problems of the times are often reflected in
the constitutional questions which these clauses present to the courts
for solution. It may well be the judgment of history that our age faced
no more vital issue than the achievement of equality of the Negro people
and the protection of unpopular and minority groups. One of the highlights of Judge Edgerton's opinions is his forceful awareness that the
time is at hand for fulfilling to the Negro the glittering assurances so
long held out.
8 9 in which he urged the abandonment,
In his dissent in Carrv. Corning,"
in the field of public school education, of the "separate but equal" doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson,9 ' he declared: "The education required for living
in a cosmopolitan community, and especially for living in a humane and
democratic country and promoting its ideals, cannot be obtained on either
side of a fence that separates a more privileged majority and a less privileged minority. ... segregation in public schools affects children during
their formative years and does so continually. It also affects them
unequally. Here at least, as a current brief for the United States
says of segregation in general, 'separate but equal' is as much a
contradiction in terms as 'black but white'; facilities which are
segregated by law solely on the basis of race or color, cannot in any
real sense be regarded as equal." It is notorious that segregated colored
schooling is never equal to segregated white schooling in objectively
188 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" message to Congress, Jan. 6,
1941, 7 VIA, SPEECHES 197-200, 87 CONG. R c. 4446 (1941).
189 182 F. 2d 14, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
190 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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measurable ways. Independently of objective differences between white
and colored schooling, school segregation means discrimination against
Negroes for two distinct reasons. (1) By preventing a dominant majority
and a depressed minority from learning each other's ways, school segregation inflicts a greater economic and social handicap on the minority than
on the majority. It aggravates the disadvantages of Negroes and helps
to preserve their subordinate status. (2) School segregation is humiliating to Negroes. Courts have sometimes denied that segregation implies
inferiority. This amounts to saying, in the face of the obvious fact of
racial prejudice, that the whites who impose segregation do not consider
Negroes inferior. . . . It is sometimes suggested that due process of
law cannot require what law cannot enforce. No such suggestion is
relevant here. When United States courts order integration of District
of Columbia schools they will be integrated. It has been too long forgotten
that the District of Columbia is not a provincial community but the
cosmopolitan capital of a nation that professes democracy."19 1
Before the Supreme Court had prohibited judicial enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants in the field of housing, Judge Edgerton in two
dissents written at different stages of the case of Mays v. Burgess92
urged that his court not lend its powers to the perpetuation of this type
of segregation. Two years later he foreshadowed the Supreme Court
decision in a third dissent in which he declared: "Negroes have a constitutional right to buy and use, and whites to sell to Negroes, whatever
real property they can without direct government interference based
on race.... It has been contended that enforcement of covenants which
exclude a race from a neighborhood does not involve discrimination
because it permits reciprocity. This amounts to saying that if Negroes
are excluded from decent housing they may retaliate by excluding whites
from slums. Such reciprocity is not merely imaginary and unequal but
irrelevant .... Rules which the due process clause forbids legislatures
to enact it forbids courts to adopt, for substantive due process is not
a matter of method .... It is strangely inconsistent to hold as this court
does that although no legislature can authorize a court, even for a moment,
to prevent Negroes from acquiring and using particular property, a mere
owner of property at a given moment can authorize a court to do so for
all time."'9
191 Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
192 147 F. 2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868, 896;

152

F.2d 123 (D.C.

Cir. 1945).
193 Dissent inHurd v.Hodge, 162 F.2d 233, 238, 239, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334
U.S. 24 (1948).
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In both the public school and housing segregation cases Judge Edgerton's dissenting opinions go beyond the technical constitutional arguments.
Departing from his customary brevity he sketches the sociological background and consequences of segregation. In Hall v. United States
Negroes, though included in the panel from which a trial jury was
chosen, were all challenged peremptorily by the prosecutor, and the
government impliedly admitted that the challenges were intended to
exclude all Negroes from the jury. Judge Edgerton declared: "Whether
this discrimination against Negroes did or did not violate the Act of
Congress I think it violated the plainly expressed policy of Congress, the
plainly expressed policy of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor's obliga94
tion of fairness, and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."
Civil Liberties. Ever since the first group of "free speech" cases9 5
decided by the Supreme Court of Holmes and Brandeis, there has been
debate as to the extent to which radicals and dissenters should be
permitted to advocate their doctrines. After World War I Socialists and
assorted political dissenters were the interdicted groups. Currently the
Communists and those who appear to adhere to non-conforming views
on a wide range of subjects are the objects of hostile government action.
The campaign against "un-American" and "subversive" groups creates
a crucial stage in the constitutional development of the scope of our
civil liberties. This in turn involves basically the degree of flexibility
for change with which we are to endow our constitutional and legislative
framework, for the amending process becomes jejune unless people
may advocate every side of every issue and every conceivable solution
of the nation's problems.
In a series of notable dissents that mar receive an honored niche in
the constitutional history of this era, Judge Edgerton has become one of
194 Dissent, 168 F. 2d 161, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U..S. 853, rehearing
denied, 335 U.S. 839 (1948).
This concern for the rights of Negroes is probably an element in other constitutional
opinions of Judge Edgerton, in which the person involved is a Negro but in which the
express ground of the opinion is directed toward other constitutional considerations. See
for examples, Johnson v. United States, 110 F. 2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Bullock v. United
States, 122 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1941); concurring opinion in Holmes v. United States,
171 F. 2d 1022, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1948); dissent in Garner v. United States, 174 F. 2d 499,
503 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 945 (1949).
395 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919) ; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) ; Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1920) ; Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) ; Pierce v. United States,
252 U.S. 239 (1920). See, Vinson, C.J., in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503
(1951): "No important case involving free speech was decided by this Court prior to
."
Schenck v. United States.
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the foremost exponents of the liberal and what was until recently the
prevailing view of civil liberties. By a curious quirk of history, just when
the liberal position on civil liberties seemed to have become the accepted
view in the Supreme Court, a shift of political climate, brought about
by a combination of circumstances domestic and foreign, again put
the liberal position on civil liberties in the shade. In the face of this
shift, Judge Edgerton held fast to that position and thereby helped to give
renewed vitality to the civil liberties tradition. But even more, by adhering
to it he has braced those who have felt that the nation's highest destiny
lies in the fulfillment of its professions of freedom. If it is true that
"judges, howsoever they may conscientiously seek to discipline themselves
against it, unconsciously are too apt to be moved by the deep undercurrents of public feeling,"' 9 6 and if this explains the current anti-libertarian
trend in judicial decision, Judge Edgerton is an important exception
in the development of constitutional law.
In the Barsky case he declared: "In my opinion the House [UnAmerican Activities] Committee's investigation abridges freedom of
speech and inflicts punishment without trial; and the statute the appellants are convicted of violating provides no ascertainable standard of
guilt.... The power of investigation, like the power of taxation, stops
short of restricting the freedoms protected by the First Amendment....
The investigation restricts the freedom of speech by uncovering and
stigmatizing expressions of unpopular views.... This exposes the men and
women whose views are advertised to risks of insult, ostracism, and
lasting loss of employment.... The Committee's practice of advertising
and stigmatizing unpopular views is therefore a strong deterrent to any
expression, however private, of such views. The investigation also restricts
freedom of speech by forcing people to express views. Freedom of
speech.., includes freedom not to speak. 'To force an American citizen
publicly to profess any statement of belief' is to violate the First Amendment.... The privilege of choosing between speech that means ostracism
and speech that means perjury is not freedom of speech. . . . People
have grown wary of expressing any unorthodox opinions. No one can
measure the inroad the Committee has made in the American sense of
freedom to speak.... There is no evidence in the record that propaganda
196 Frankfurter, J., in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 556 01951). There are at
least two points of criticism of this dictum. First, there appear to be periods, as during
the first term of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, when the Supreme Court has acted
contrary to majority opinion of the people. Secondly, it may not be any easier for courts
to learn what "the deep undercurrents of public feeling" are than for prognosticators of

national elections.
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has created danger, clear and present or obscure and remote, that the
government of the United States or any government in the United States
will be overthrown by force or violence. ... The premise that the government must have power to protect itself by discovering whether it is in
clear and present danger of overthrow by violence is sound. But it does
not support the conclusion that Congress may compel men to disclose
their personal opinions, to a committee and also to the world . . .""
In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark the same organization that was involved in the Barsky case sued to enjoin the Attorney
General and the Loyalty Review Board from designating the organization as subversive and thereby in effect forbidding membership therein
to all government employees. Dissenting from an affirmance of the
dismissal of the suit, Judge Edgerton declared: "Helping former Spanish
Republicans is not evidence of disloyalty to the government of the United
States. ... Appellees' ruling, in its context, is a public warning that sympathetic association with appellant may cause government employees to
be dismissed. It therefore puts government employees, present and
prospective, under economic and social pressure not to support any of
appellant's activities, verbally or otherwise, and in particular to stay
away from appellant's meetings. In other words the ruling restricts the
98
freedom of speech and assembly of 'government employees."'
Dissenting in Bailey v. Richardson, he declared: "Without trial by
jury, without evidence, and without even being allowed to confront her
accusers or to know their identity, a citizen of the United States has been
found disloyal to the government of the United States. For her supposed
disloyal thoughts she has been punished by dismissal from a wholly
nonsensitive position in which her efficiency rating was high. The case
received nation-wide publicity. Ostracism inevitably followed. A finding
of disloyalty is closely akin to a finding of treason. The public hardly
distinguishes between the two.... However respectable her anonymous

accusers may have been, if her dismissal is sustained the livelihood and
reputation of any civil servant today and perhaps of any American
tomorrow are at the mercy not only of an innocently mistaken informer
but also of a malicious or demented one unless his defect is apparent
197 Dissent, 167 F.2d 241, 252, 253, 254, 255, 258, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 834 (1948), rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 971 (1950).
198 joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F. 2d 79, 86, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1949),
rev'd, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). This dissent is reaffirmed in International Workers Order, Inc.
v. McG0ath, 182 F. 2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), and in Washington
v. McGrath, 182 F. 2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
923 (1951) .
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to the agent who interviews him. ...

Appellant's dismissal for wrong

thoughts has nothing to do with protecting the security of the United
States. .

. Since dismissal from government service for disloyalty is

punishment, due process of law requires that the accused employee
be given all the safeguards of a judicial trial before it is imposed....
Appellant's dismissal bridges freedom of speech and assembly. Mr.
Justice Holmes' famous statement, made in 1892 when he was a member
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, that 'the petitioner
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman' is greatly oversimplified.... the premise
that government employment is a privilege does not support the conclusion that it may be granted on condition that certain economic or
political ideas not be entertained.... Freedoms that may not be abridged
by law may not be abridged by executive order.... Appellant's dismissal
attributes guilt by association, and thereby denies both the freedom of
assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment and the due process of
law guaranteed by the Fifth."' 99
In Lapides v. Clark, Judge Edgerton had occasion to pass upon the
practice of subjecting naturalized citizens to special disabilities. He
dissented against excluding from the country a naturalized citizen
who had lost his citizenship by sojourning abroad, in Palestine,
for more than five years: "The Constitution empowers Congress
'to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.' .

.

. It increases, the

number of citizens but does not divide them into classes. ... Deprivation
of liberty by severe and arbitrary discrimination is not due process of
law. Aside from the Nationality Act, citizens may live abroad. By
imposing a heavy penalty on the exercise of this liberty the Nationality
Act takes part of it away from all naturalized citizens, regardless of
their devotion to America and their connections here."2 0 0
The requirements of the Bill of Rights are regarded by Judge Edgerton
not as technical rules but as elements indispensable to the democratic
way of life. In some cases he has expressly stated this view, as in a
dissent against a conviction obtained by third degree methods, which he
declared to be "a violation of civil rights that cannot be tolerated in a
democratic society.""' In another case he dissented from a conviction
199 182 F. 2d 46, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 341 U. S. 918 (1951) (Italics Judge's.) ; and see concurring opinions of Douglas and
Jackson, II., in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 1123, 175,
183 (1951).
200 176 F.2d 619, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860, 888 (1949).
201 Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. 2d 167, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd, 335 U.S. 410
(1948).
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upon evidence obtained by police who broke into a rooming house, stood
on a chair in a hall, and looked through a transom into the defendant's
room. Judge Edgerton said: "To hold that McDonald cannot complain
because he is only a roomer perverts the letter as well as the spirit of
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and creates a
discrimination in civil rights that is out of place in a democratic
society."20 2 Though not inclined to stand on technicality, 0 3 Judge Edgerton has been insistent, often in dissent, that the right of criminal
defendants to counsel be enforced,2"' that the police refrain from third
2 6
degree practices 20 5 and from unlawful07 searches and seizures, 0 and that
trials be fair and free from prejudice.
Administrative Action
In accordance with one segment of his
runs through Judge Edgerton's opinions a
government administrative action. These
of departments and agencies both of the

constitutional views,20 there
strain of principle sustaining
opinions cover a wide range
United States20 9 and of the

202 McDonald v. United States, 166 F. 2d 957, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd, 335 U.S. 451
(1948).
203 See, for example, Pope v. Huff, 141 F. 2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1944); United States v.
Boyer, 150 F. 2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Hawkins v. United States, 158 F. 2d 652 (D.C.
Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 830, 869 (1947) ; Christoffel v. United States, 171 F. 2d
1004 (D.C. Cir. 1948), revd, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
204 Johnson v. United States, 110 F. 2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940); dissent in Mcjordan v.
Huff, 133 F. 2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
205 Bullock v. United States, 122 F. 2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1941); dissent in Upshaw v.
United States, 168 F. 2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); dissent in
Garner v. United States, 174 F. 2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 945 (1949).
206 Dissent in McDonald v. United States, 166 F. 2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd, 335
U.S. 451 (1948) ; McKnight v. United States, 183 F. 2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950)., See also
Jillson v. Caprio, 181 F. 2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Colpoys v. Foreman, 163 F. 2d 908, 910
(D.C. Cir. 1947): "Lawless invasion of homes is the more menacing to a democratic society
when it is committed by public officers."
207 Dissent in Welch v. United States, 135 F. 2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319
U.S. 769 (1943); dissent in Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 334 U.S.'853 (1948), rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 839 (1948); dissent in Eisler v.
United States, 176 F. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 958 (1949).
208 See pp. 180-82 supra.
209 Judge Edgerton's opinions discuss administrative action of the following departments
and agencies of the United States: Attorney General, Postmaster General, Secretary of'the
Interior, Secretary of Labor, Alien Property Custodian, Civil Aeronautics Board, Civil Service
Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal
Reserve Board, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Loyalty Review Board, National Labor Relations Board, Office of Price
Administration and successors, Patent Office, Securities and Exchange Commission, Wage
and Hour Administration, National War Labor Board, War Production Board.

1952]

OPINIONS OF JUDGE EDGERTON

District of Columbia.21 He phrases the judicial standard for determining the validity of administrative action variously: the presumption of
administrative correctness; 211 whether the decision or action could be
said to be unreasonable21 2 or consistent with the evidence, 13 or supported
by the evidence, 214 or by substantial evidence, 215 or arbitrary,210 or within
the purposes and scope of the legislation governing the case.2 17 Behind
The following agencies and departments of the District of Columbia are discussed
in his opinions: Board of Tax Appeals, Director of Department of Corrections, Superintendent of Insurance, Public Utilities Commission, Unemployment Compensation Board,
Workmen's Compensation Commission, Zoning Commission.
211 Dissent in Kelly v. Coe, 99 F. 2d 435, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1938); dissent in Carbide &
Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. Coe, 102 F. 2d 236, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Abbott v. Coe, 109
F. 2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1939); General Motors Corp. v. Coe, 120 F. 2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U. S. 688, rehearing denied, 314 U. S. 715 (1941); Magnaflux Corp. v.
Coe, 139 F. 2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Bullard Co. v. Coe, 147 F. 2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ;
dissent in Agnew v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 153 F.2d 785, 795
(D.C. Cir. 1946), rev'd, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
=1 Philadelphia Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm., 177 F. 2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
213 Abbott v. Coe, 109 F. 2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Leventhal v. District of Columbia,
100 F. 2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Eppensteiner v. Coe, 114 F. 2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Wolf
v. Coe, 112 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Magnaflux Corp. v. Coe, 139 F. 2d 531 (D.C. Cir.
1943); dissent in Hannegan v. Read Magazine, Inc., 158 F. 2d 542, 546 (D.C. Cir. "1946),
rev'd, 333 U. S. 178 (1948).
214 Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F. 2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F. 2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Avignone Freres, Inc. v. Cardillo,
117 F. 2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1940); N. L. R. B. v. Arcade-Sunshine Co., 118 F. 2d 49 (D.C.
Cir. 1940) ; Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Coe, 118 F. 2d 593 (D. C. Cir. 1940) ;
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 120 F. 2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; Central & South-west
Utilities Co. v. S. E. C., 136 F. 2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Koppers United Co. v. S. E. C.,
138 F. 2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1943); dissent in Schweitzer v. N. L. R. B., 144 F. 2d 520, 526
(D.C. Cir. 1944).
215 Simmons v. F. C. C., 145 F. 2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.
v. F.P.C., 169 F. 2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 854 (1948); dissent in
Dorsey v. Kingsland, 173 F.2d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 338 U. S. 318 (1949).
216 Leventhal v. District of Columbia, 100 F. 2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
217 Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 97
F. 2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 99 F. 2d 435 (D.C. Cir.
1938) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F. 2d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Peoples Natural
Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 127 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1942); dissent in
National Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 132 F. 2d 545, 566 (D.C.
Cir. 1942) aff'd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943); National Rifle Ass'n v. Young, 134 F.2d 524 (D.C.
Cir. 1943); L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, 140 F. 2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1944), aff'd, 322
U. S. 398 (1944); dissent in Helvering v. Insular Sugar Refining Corp., 141 F. 2d 713,
717 (D.C. Cir. 1944); National Homeopathic Hospital Ass'n v. Britton, 147 F. 2d 561
(D.C. Cir. 1945); Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 158 F.2d 521
(D.C. Cir. 1946); dissent in Agnew v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System,
153 F.2d 785, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1946), rev'd, 329 U. S. 441 (1947); dissent in Fleming v.
Moberly Milk Products Co., 160 F. 2d 259, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1947), dismissed on motion of
counsel for petitioner, 331 U.S. 786 (1947) ; dissent in Mitcheli v. Cohen, 160 F. 2d 915,
921 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 333 U. S. 411 (1948); dissent in joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. Clark, 177 F. 2d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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these legal conclusions are basic considerations. Some of these have
already been discussed in terms of the social interests that have priority
in his scale of values.2 18 He recognizes, too, that administrative bodies
developed to deal with a special activity, science, or art should not be
overruled lightly; that courts are less fitted to cope with problems in these
special fields 2 9 Unless plainly obligated to do so, courts should not
intrude upon the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals nor straightjacket administration by the "conventional judicial modes for adjusting
220
conflicting claims.
An overlapping factor, perhaps, has been a belief that most of the
administrative action he has been called upon to review has been in the
public interest. ' Thus the fact that a patent is a monopoly plays a
part 221 in his many decisions upholding denials of patents. In Abbott v.
218 See pages 166-180 supra.

219 Dissent in Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. Coe, 102 F. 2d 236, 242 (D.C. Cir.
1938); Abbott v. Coe, 109 F. 2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Nat'l War Labor Board v. Mbntgomery Ward & Co., 144 F. 2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 774 (1944);
dissent in Fleming v. Moberly Milk Products Co., 160 F.2d 259, 271 (D. C. Cir. 1947),
dismnissed on motion of counsel for petitioner, 331 U.S. 786 (1947); Philadelphia Co. v.
S. E. C., 177 F. 2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
220 Dissent in National Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 132 F. 2d 545, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
aff'd, 319 U. S. 239 (1943); Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Nat'l
War Labor Board, 143 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944);
Millis v. Inland Empire District Council, 144 F. 2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1944), aff'd, 325 U.S.
697 (1945) ; Bullard Co. v. Coe, 147 F. 2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; dissent in Peoples Bank
v. Eccles, 161 F. 2d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 426, rehearing denied, 333
U. S. 877 (1948); Kingsland v. Carter Carburetor Co., 168 F. 2d 565 (D.C. Cir 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 819, rehearing denied, 335 U. S. 864 (1948) ; dissent in SheridanWyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 172 F. 2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 338 U.S. 621 (1950).
22 Leventhal v. District of Columbia 100 F. 2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Evangelical
Lutheran Synod v. F. C. C., 105 F. 2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Colorado Radio Corp. v.
F. C. C., 118 F. 2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1941); National Hospital Service Society, Inc. v.
Jordan, 128 F.2d 460 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 664 (1942); National Rifle
Ass'n v. Young, 134 F. 2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Koppers United Co. v. S. E. C., 138 F. 2d
577 (D.C. Cir. 1943); dissent in Broadcasting Service Organization, Inc. v. F.C.C., 171
F. 2d 1007, 1015 (D.C. Cir 1948), rev'd, 337 U. S. 901 (1949) ; dissent in Dorsey v. Kingsland,
173 F. 2d 405, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd, 338 U. S. 318 (1949); International Standard
Electric Corp. v. Marzall, 184 F. 2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
222 Dissent in Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. Coe, 102 F. 2d 236, 242 (D.C. Cir.
1938); Abercrombie v. Coe, 119 F. 2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Dixie Rose Nursery v. Coe,
131 F. 2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 782 (1943); International Standard
Electric Corp. v. Marzall, 184 F. 2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Cf. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 154 (1950); and Douglas, J.,
dissent in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U. S. 827, 836, rehearing
denied, 340 U. S. 846 (1950). On the theme of monopoly, see also Edgerton's opinion in
another field, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 169 F.2d
881 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 854 (1948). But when the nation's interest or
Congressional policy interdict the duplication of facilities by a would-be competitor, the
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Coem the presumption of the correctness of administrative decisions was
applied, on the basis of a dissent by Judge Edgerton in a previous case,224
to a Patent Office decision that patent claims showed no "invention."
The court had long treated the question of "invention" in suits to obtain
a patent, of which there are many in the District of Columbia, as an
original question. Since Abbott v. Coe the court has given due weight
to the findings of the Patent Office and the District Court in these cases.'
Judge Edgerton has of course sometimes found it necessary to reject
administrative rulings.226 In some cases the agency had in effect confessed
error by failing to appeal from a reversal in a lower court.
In some
there were new or additional factors that had not been considered by
the administrative agency.228 In several cases Judge Edgerton thought
the administrative finding unsupportable on the merits. He wrote for
the court reversing the Patent Office and the District Court and holding
a pain-reducing drug used in cancer treatment clearly useful and patentable."39 He construed patent procedure liberally, reversing the Patent
Office's construction of the statutory requirement of a description of
the claimed invention. ° He dissented from affirming a refund, by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, of a sugar processing tax which the
processor had not absorbed but had passed on to his customers 2 5 He
dissented from dismissal of the government's petition for lower electric
rates in the District of Columbia, basing his view in part on inordinate
232
utility profits in previous years.
Reversing the action of the Postmaster General in barring from the
plea of monopoly is not effective. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 97 F. 2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
223 109 F. 2d 449, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1939), before Edgerton, Vinson, and Rutledge, J3.
224 Carbide & Carbon ChemLcals Corp. v. Coe, 102 F. 2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
225 See also Power Patents Co. v. Coe, 110 F. 2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1940), for another
instance of the use of the technique of distinguishing a seemingly applicable precedent.
226 See dissent in Helvering v. Insular Sugar Refining Corp., 141 F. 2d 713, 722 (D.C.
Cir. 1944): "The principle of administrative finality, as I understand it, does not require
or permit this court to sustain a decision which has no rational basis in the evidence and
is based upon an error of law."
227 Weeks v. Behrend, 135 F. 2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 154 F. 2d
330 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 724 (1946).
228 Allison Coupon Co. v. Bank of Commerce & Savings, 111 F. 2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Gebhard v. General Motors Sales Corp., 135 F. 2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Braniff Airways,
Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 147 F. 2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; Jones v. Clemmer, 163 F. 2d
852 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
229 Canadian Pharmaceutical Co. v. Coe, 126 F. 2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
230 International Standard Electric Corp. v. Ooms, 157 F. 2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
231 Helvering v. Insular Sugar Refining Corp., 141 F. 2d 713, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
232 United States v. Public Utility Commission, 158 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 816 (1947).
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mails a pamphlet containing detailed information about marriage, he
held that the publication was not obscene nor violative of the prohibition
against birth control literature, that the exclusion of the paper without
a hearing was a denial of due process, and that it might be a violation of
freedom of speech.'
In one of the loyalty cases previously discussed
he urged reversal of the Loyalty Review Board on the ground that its
action was not supported by evidence and violated the governing statute
and regulations and the Bill of Rights." 4 In the other loyalty cases he
dissented from dismissal of suits to overturn rulings of the Attorney
General.'
IMPACT UPON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF THE LAW

Judge Edgerton's opinions reflect the re-examination and reappraisal
of judicial doctrine-in more placid times a measure of the stature of
a judge. In some cases they sweep away cobwebs that hamper the
progress of the law; in others they conform legal rules to recent developments in other fields, or to his conception of social needs.
Evidence and Procedure
Judge Edgerton has favored a broad and less technical construction
of the rules of adjective law." 6 In Beach v. Beach, a wife's suit for
233 Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F. 2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
234 Dissent in Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd by

an
equally divided Court, 341 U. S. 918 (1951).
235 Dissents in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F. 2d 79, 84 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), rev'd, 341 U. S. 123 (d951); International Workers Order, Inc. v. McGrath,
182 F. 2d 368, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd, 341 U. S. 123 (1951); Washington v McGrath,
182 F. 2d 375, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 923 (1951).
236 Evidence: Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1938); General Finance,
Inc. v. Stratford, 109 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Nu Car Carriers, Inc. v. Traynor, 125
F. 2d 47 (1942); Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Rochinski, 158 F. 2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1946);
Rosinski v. Whiteford, 184 F. 2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Procedure: Webb v. Lohnes, 96 F. 2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S.
637 (1939); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, 99 F. 2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Goodacre
v. Panagopoulos, 110 F. 2d 716 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Frank v. Malone, 126 F. 2d 651 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); dissent in Freid v. McGrath, 133 F. 2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Shima v. Brown,
133 F. 2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 787 (1943) ; Rabenovets v. Crossland,
137 F. 2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Hecht Co., Inc. v. Harrison, 137 F. 2d 687 (D.C. Cir.
1943) ; National War Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 144 F. 2d 528 (D.C.
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 774 (1944); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 147 F. 2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1945); dissent in District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d
833, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1947); dissent in United States v. Seigel, 168 F. 2d 143, 147 (D.C.
Cir. 1948).
Pleading: Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Keiser
v. Walsh, 118 F. 2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Brady v. Games, 128 F. 2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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support, the husband denied paternity of a child and counterclaimed for
divorce on the ground of adultery. Affirming the trial court's order
that the wife and child submit to blood grouping tests, Judge Edgerton
held that the scientific validity of such tests had been established; that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though not specifically mentioning
these tests, impliedly sanctioned their use in paternity cases; and that
this conclusion "is aided.., by the direction in Rule 1 to construe the
rules to secure a just result .... The historic restrictions on testimony to
'non-access) are an added reason for admitting this evidence, which is
2 37
independent of non-access.
He has advocated liberal interpretation of the federal shop book rule
to admit in evidence hospital records" 8 and police accident reports 1 9
as records made in the regular course of business. But he has not favored
relaxation of procedural or evidentiary rules when important safeguards
would be impaired. 2 4 °
Corporations
In Brownley v. Peyser a holding company had milked its subsidiary.
Both companies became insolvent and the receiver of the holding
company attempted to collect a debt from the subsidiary. In effect this
was a suit between the creditors of the two corporations. In upholding
a dismissal of the receiver's complaint, Judge Edgerton said: "Much of
appellant's argument proceeds as if it were immaterial which was the
holding corporation and which the subsidiary. There is danger that a
sole stockholder will take advantage of his corporation, and so of its
creditors, and rules have grown up to check that danger. It is less likely
that a corporation will take advantage of its sole stockholder, and so
of his creditors, and the same rules do not apply. Appellant's position
is that the tail wagged the dog. Actually the wagging was of the normal
,2 41

sort."

Appeals: Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 126 F. 2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1942).

.. Statute

of Limitations: Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Cardillo, 107 F. 2d 962 (D.C.

Cir. 1939).

Jurisdition: Concurring opinion in Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511, 518
(D.C. Cir. 1943).
237 114 F. 2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
238 Concurring opinion in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297, 30I (D.C.
Cir. 1944) ; dissent in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297, 306 (D.C. Cir 1945).
239

MacWilliams v. Lewis, 125 F. 2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1941).

240 Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 126 F. 2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Brown v. United States, 152

F. 2d 138 (D.C. Cir 1945).
241 98 F. 2d 337, 339-340 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
242 105 F. 2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 11939).
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In Bowen v. Mount Vernon Savings Bank2" corporate interrelations
were again involved. A bank which exacted usury transferred the note
to another bank. Two officers and directors handling the usurious loan
for the first bank were also officers and directors of the transferee bank.
Holding that the knowledge of the interlocking officers and directors was
imputable to the transferee bank, Judge Edgerton sustained the defense
of usury.
Agency
He also said in the Bowen case: "The real reason for the rule which
charges a principal with his agent's knowledge is simply the injustice
of allowing the principal to avoid, by acting vicariously, burdens to which
he would become subject if he were acting for himself." 4
The principal's duty of fair dealing is underlined in two interesting
cases. In one a salesman engaged for an indefinite period was discharged
before the effects of his salesmanship could be determined. Permitting
a recovery of commissions for orders received after the discharge, Judge
Edgerton held that "the termination must be in good faith" and not "for
the purpbse of depriving the broker of commissions to become due for
work already done." 2 " In the other case a broker brought about the
sale of property on terms deviating from but more advantageous than
those the owner had authorized. In sustaining the broker's recovery,
Judge Edgerton said: "Appellants are in much the same position as a
man who refuses to accept $101 because his contract called for only
$100.))245
But an agent also has a duty of fair dealing. "... his duty forbids
him, during the agency, to ask his principal's customers to transfer their
custom, even though the transfer is not to take effect until after the
agency ceases."246
Equity
In Berrien v. PollitzerJudge Edgerton came to grips with the "tradition
that equity protects only property rights." The plaintiff's suit for an
injunction against exclusion from the National Woman's Party had been
dismissed by the lower court on the ground of this "tradition." In reversing, Judge Edgerton declared: "The doctrine that equity jurisdiction
is limited to the protection of property rights conflicts with the familiar
105 F. 2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
Potomac Chemical Co. v. Chapman, 146 F. 2d 664, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U. S. 881 (1945). See also General Finance, Inc. v. Stratford, 109 F. 2d 843 (D.C.
Cir. 1940).
24s Buckner v. Tweed, 157 F. 2d 211, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
246 Keiser v. Walsh, 118 F. 2d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
243
244
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principle that equity may give preventive relief when the legal remedy
of money damages . is inadequate . . .Obviously money has little
in common with such personal rights or interests as reputation, domestic
247
relations, or membership in nonprofit organizations."

Judge Edgerton's stress of fairness and justice and his rejection of
mechanistic application of law is illustrated by his opinions with regard
to restrictive covenants. On the one hand he approved an injunction to
enforce a covenant, given in the sale of a business, not to engage in a
similar business in the District of Columbia, when the seller established
a new business outside the District but advertised it in Washington. 48
On the other hand he has freely applied the principle that restrictive
covenants governing the use of land, admittedly breached, do not necessarily merit equitable relief, because changed neighborhood conditions
may make it inequitable to grant an injunction.2 49
Marital Relations
In Parks v. Parks Judge Edgerton initiated a line"s1 of liberal interpretations of the District of Columbia statute authorizing absolute
divorce for "voluntary separation" for five consecutive years without
cohabitation. The wife claimed that because the separation was originally
involuntary on her part, the ensuing period of separation was also involuntary. Holding that neither the involuntary origin of the separation
nor the husband's fault were defenses to his suit, Judge Edgerton
declared: "Even if she did in fact wish her husband to return, in the
course of time her silent acquiescence in the separation made it voluntary
in the statutory sense. Desires which are not reflected in conduct have
little or no social or legal significance." 2 In another case he declared:
"When a separation has continued more than five years and neither party
has tried to end it a divorce should be granted.""ns He summed up his
views: "The liberal purpose [of the statute] ...was to permit termination in law of certain marriages which have ceased to exist in fact. '' 254
°

247 165 F. 2d 21, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
248 Hartung v. Hilda Miller, Inc., 133 F. 2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
249 Dissent in Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869, 877 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U. S.
868, 896 (1945), 152 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1945); dissent in St. Lo Construction Co. v.
Koenigsberger, 174 F.2d 25, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949).
250 1116 F. 2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
251 Bowers v. Bowers, 143 F. 2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Buford v. Buford, 156 F. 2d
567 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
252 116 F. 2d 556, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
2Z3 Buford v. Buford, 156 F. 2d 567, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
2-4 Parks v. Parks, 1,16
F. 2d 556, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
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"The purpose of the five-year law is not to punish vice or reward
virtue...,,15
In Garman v. Garman"' he dealt with the effect of a "mail order"
Mexican divorce. Dissenting from sustaining the husband's right to sue
for divorce subsequently in the District of Columbia, Judge Edgerton
urged that the husband should be estopped by his participation in the
Mexican proceedings from complaining of his wife's conduct subsequent
to the Mexican decree. The non-punitive approach is reflected in his
treatment of other problems in this field. A wife divorced by her husband
because of adultery was nevertheless awarded custody of her children,
alimony for their support, and counsel fees; the important consideration
was that "the wife was a devoted and successful mother.""5 7 A meretricious relationship was permitted to ripen into marriage upon removal of
the impediment of a prior marriage of one of the parties.',,
Criminal Justice
Judge Edgerton's attitude in this field is reflected in his decision
that "The view that evidence of uncommunicated threats . . should be
admitted seems to us logical and humane.""5 9 In Bullock v. United States
he was confronted with one of the baffling2 6 ° problems of criminal law-a
meaningful distinction between first and second degree murder. The
trial court had charged that the "deliberate and premeditated" intent
necessary for first degree murder did not require "any appreciable length
of time." Reversing the conviction, Judge Edgerton declared: "To speak
of premeditation and deliberation which are instantaneous, or which take
no appreciable time, is a contradiction in terms. It deprives the statutory
requirement of all meaning . . . Statutes like ours, which distinguish
deliberate and premeditated murder from other murder, reflect a belief
that one who meditates an intent to kill and then deliberately executes
it is more dangerous, more culpable or less capable of reformation than
one who kills on sudden impulse; or that the prospect of the death penalty
is more likely to deter men from deliberate than from impulsive
261
murder."
In Ckaplin v. United States Judge Edgerton dissented from adoption
255 Buford v. Buford, 156 F. 2d 567, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
2-56 102 F. 2d 272, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1939).

Jaffe v. Jaffe, 124 F. 2d 233, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
Thomas v. Murphy, 107 F. 2d 268, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1939): "Since marriage is preferable
to concubinage, this result seems socially sound."
259 Griffin v. United States, 183 F. 2d 990, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
257

258

260 CARDOZO, LAW AND LiTERATuRE 95-101 (1931).
261 122 F. 2d 213-214 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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of the prevailing view that a misstatement of intention cannot be the
basis of obtaining money by false pretenses: "The fiction that a promise
made without intent to perform does not embody a misrepresentation
conflicts with the facts, with the deceit cases, and with the interest of
society in protecting itself against fraud.... That a fool and his money
are soon parted was once accepted as a sort of natural law....

But in

modern times, no one not talking law would be likely to deny that society
should protect mental as well as physical helplessness against intentional
2 62
injuries.)
In Johnson v. United States the casualty was the old common law rule
that husband and wife are legally incapable of conspiring with each
other. In holding that the married women's emancipation laws made
this rule obsolete, he declared: ". . . the relation of husband and wife
does not prevent two persons from conspiring to commit an offense. The
interest of society in repressing crime requires that the fact be recognized,
and our common-law system does not require that its recognition await
263
express legislative action.)
Humaneness but not softness, 64 fairness to the accused and convicted265 yet concern for the interests of the community, disregard of
technicalities, 26 6 regard for substantial rights 2 6 ---these are the differing
262 157 F. 2d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1946). See Curtiss, A State of Mind: Fact or Fancy,
33 CoR-E.L L.Q. 351, 356-359 (1948).
263 157 F. 2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
264- King v. United States, 98 F. 2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; Bennett v. United States,
104 F. 2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; McGowen v. United States, 105 F. 2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 308 U. S. 552 (1939) ; Tatum v. United States, 110 F. 2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ;
Berry v. United States, 113 F. 2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Boyer v. United States, 132 F. 2d
12 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; dissent in Lindsey v. United States, 133 F. 2d 368, 378 (D:C. Cir. 1942) ;
Fretz v. United States, 140 F. 2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Pope v. Huff, 141 F. 2d 727 (D.C.
Cir. .1944); Hawkins v. United States, 158 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331
U. S. 830, 869 (1946). See Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 YALF L.J. 827
(1927), especially at 833.
265 Johnson v. United States, 110 F. 2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; dissent in Welch v. United
States, 135 F.2d 465, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 769 (1943); Williams v.
Huff, 142 F. 2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944). "A repellant charge does not destroy the presumption
of innocence or justify a conviction on evidence which is neither competent nor trustworthy."
Brown v. United States, 152 F. 2d 138, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
266 King v. United States, 98 F. 2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Guy v. United States, 107
F. 2d 288 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 618, 640 (1939) ; Morris v. District of Columbia, 124 F. 2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; dissent in Lindsey v. United States, 133 F. 2d 368, 378
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Fretz v. United States, 140 F. 2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Boyer v. United
States, 132 F. 2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Bord v. United States, 133 F. 2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 671 (1942). In the Lindsey case, supra at 380, he declared, quoting
Wigmore: "It is neither correct nor useful to attach 'the monstrous penalty of a new trial'
to supposed technical errors, if any, which are not prejudicial."
267 Williams v. United States, 110 F. 2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Boyer v. United States,
132 F. 2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Brown v. United States, .152 F. 2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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and often conflicting considerations which Judge Edgerton has weighed
and balanced. Though the criminal law is not a game in which "a wrong
move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner,"2 68 the prisoner's
2 69
rights must be respected.

Torts
Judge Edgerton's treatment of the cases in this field exemplifies his
practice of evaluating and reappraising legal rules. He does not adopt
reform for reform's sake. Contribution among joint tort feasors, a reform
advocated by respectable authority, 7° was rejected because he doubted
whether it was good for society "'even though it [the common law
denial of contribution] mars a theoretical symmetry in the law of
negligence.' ),271
While recognizing that the law does not permit recovery for all nervous
27 2
shock, he breached the common law wall against recovery in such cases.
Despite the dearth of authority, he sustained the right of a married
woman to sue her husband's co-conspirator in the making of a false
268 King v. United States, 98 F. 2d 291, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
269 In one of his pre-judicial writings, Edgerton, Book Review, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 511,
512 (1934), he declared: "When prosecutors always seek justice rather than convictions,
when prisons are preventive and curative rather than vindictive, when sentences are short
and parole is prompt for men who are no menace to society, criminal defense may have
little appeal to socially-minded lawyers. But while the four corners of the country can
produce a Mooney case, a Centralia case, a Sacco-Vanzetti case and a Scottsboro case, some
men are playing a deadly game in the name of the state, and the game that other men play
in behalf of defendants is relatively humane as well as inevitable."
The sensible practice of permitting the jury to take with them a written copy of the
judge's instruction was approved, because "We see no good reason why the members of
a jury should always be required to debate and rely upon their several recollections of
what a judge said when proof of what he said is readily available." Copeland v. United States,
152 F.2d 769, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U. S. 841 (1946).
The rule against the use of evidence of other crimes has not been a shibboleth, Bord v.
United States, 133 F. 2d 313 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 671 (1942); Copeland v.
United States, 152 F. 2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 841 (1946), but has

been followed when injustice would result if it were not. Boyer v. United States, 132 F. 2d
12 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
270 SECOND AmNjuAL REPORT OF THE LAW REViSION CommSSiOm oF THE STATE OF NEW
YORE 699-747 (1936),, (Legislative Document (1937) N 65); TmIRD AN'UAL REPORT OF
THE LAW REVISION Com
sloN OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 67-82 (1937) (Legislative
Document (1937) N 65); FouRTa ANNuAL REPORT oF THE LAW REVisIOx ComimrSSIoN OF
TnE STATE OF NEW YORK 65-88 (1938) (Legislative Document (1938) N 65).
271

Dissent in George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F. 2d 219, 223 (D.C. Cir.

1942), quoting from James, Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism,

54 iHRV. L. REV. 1156, 1169. See also, Yellow Cab Co. v. Janson, 179 F. 2d 54 (D.C.
Cir. 1949).
272 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F. 2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Colpoys v.
Foreman, 163 F. 2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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charge of adultery in a divorce suit.2 78 He has taken a broad view of
the right to redress for false arrest and imprisonment. In one case, though
police officers actually made the arrest, Judge Edgerton sustained the
liability of the telephone company whose employees pointed out the
plaintiff to enable the police to seize him.27 4 In another he held a psychiatrist liable for advising the police to detain a woman as insane without following the statutory procedure for commitment. "Not only the
perpetrator but the instigator of unlawful violence is fully responsible
to its victim. A request or advice, express or implied, that is effective in
fact is effective in law; neither command nor authority is necessary....
In providing protection for persons whose relatives think or pretend to
think they require restraint because of mental illness, Congress necessarily struck a balance between individual liberty and public safety. A
policeman or a psychiatrist may think Congress should have drawn the
line in a different place but may not make arrests on that theory."275
In a similar vein, Judge Edgerton held a United States Marshal liable
for forcible entry into a home to serve a valid warrant of civil arrest
27 6
for contempt
The defamation cases demonstrate the balancing process. On the one
hand the social objective of providing a remedy for injury creates a drive
for redress for harmful statements. On the other hand "Whatever is
' 7
added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate.
Accordingly, even in the face of contrary judicial opinion, Judge Edgerton held that a charge of price cutting was slanderous per se, as harmful
to the plaintiff's business, though there is no consensus in the community
against the practice; 2 7 8 and in the same opinion he ruled that ambiguous
statements subject to interpretation as aspersions upon business credit
279
were also actionable per se
In Colpoys v. Gates he held that the United States Marshal for the
District of Columbia was liable for his defamatory statements about
deputy marshals who, after suspension, had resigned their positions.
278 Ewald v. Lane, 104 F. 2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
274 Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Lewis, 99 F. 2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
276 Jillson v. Caprio, 181 F. 2d 523, 524-525 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
276 Colpoys v. Foreman, 163 F. 2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
See also Soffos v. Ea:ton, 152 F. 2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945), for another interesting instance

of redress for tort.
277 Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F. 2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denie'd, 317 U. S. 678
(1942).
278 And, it might be said but was not, despite the fact that many successful and respected
businesses have been built up on the reputation of price cutting. Indeed, in a competitive
economy, it appears to be anomalous that price competition in itself should bring disrepute.
270 Meyerson v. Hurlbut, 98 F. 2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
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Though a cabinet officer is "absolutely privileged to publish defamation,
not only in doing his duty but also in discussing it" such a privilege does
not extend to a marshal whose duty to dismiss his deputies does not
include the duty "publicly to discuss their dismissal. '2 8° In Thackrey
v. PattersonJudge Edgerton sustained a libel suit by a newspaper publisher and her editor, who were husband and wife, against another publisher who had printed articles charging marital discord between the
plaintiffs and romantically linking the wife's name with a third publisher 2 81 And in proving a case of libel, the plaintiff was accorded wide
latitude to show malice and hostility.8
But in Potts v. Dies Judge Edgerton held that a publication by a
Congressman which charged a magazine with Nazi sympathies was privileged because "Published work is of public interest. It is well settled
that fair criticism or comment on matters of public interest is not actionable in the absence of 'malice,' i.e., bad faith or bad motive. .

.

. the

qualities which [an author or publisher] has shown by what he has
published are open to such analysis and comment as an honest and intelligent man might make. 28s In Sweeney v. Patterson he held that newspaper articles written by the columnists Pearson and Allen charging a
Congressman with anti-semitism in his political activity were privileged
because of the public interest in information and discussion regarding
the governing body of the nation. "Cases which impose liability for
erroneous reports of the political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete
doctrine that the governed must not criticize their governors." 84 And
in Brown v. Shimabukuro he construed the absolute privilege accorded
pleadings and affidavits to include all statements "that a reasonable man
might think . . . relevant" even though they are not "relevant in any
28 5

strict sense.
Years before he became a judge, Edgerton wrote: "I believe that, in
cases which present problems of 'legal cause' in the familiar sense of
the phrase, it is seldom possible to isolate a question the answer to which
will not be influenced by the trier's ideas of policy or justice.' 28 6 Certainty and fixed rules in this area of the law are not possible or desirable
since "The field is one in which intelligence cannot accomplish a decent
280 118 F. 2d 16, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1941).

281 157 F. 2d 614 (D:C. Cir. 1946).
282 McCowen v. Boone, 154 F. 2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
283 132 F.2d 734, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 762 (1943).
284 128 F. 2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 678 (1942).
285 118 F. 2d 17, 18 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
286 Edgerton, Book Review, 29 CoL. L. REv. 229, 231 (1929).
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result without the aid of intuition 28 7 and a judgment as to policy. 8
This judgment must be made by the trier of the fact-the jury289 in a
jury trial, the judge in a trial by the court.
These statements keynote much of his judicial writing in negligence
cases. In Christie v. Callahan, dissenting against holding a doctor liable
for malpractice in X-ray treatments, he concluded that it was "doubtful
... whether a jury could reasonably29 ° find" that the doctor's treatment
caused the injury.2"' But regardless of causation, he contended there
was no substantial evidence of negligence. In Hecht Co., Inc. v. Harriso2 92 he sustained a jury's finding of negligence in favor of a store
customer who was tripped by a 3/16 inch difference in level between a
floor and the end of a ramp, although thousands of other customers had
walked through the same place without injury.
In several cases Judge Edgerton dealt with the legal effect of intervening acts by third persons. He held that an "intermeddler's conduct
[which] was itself a proximate cause of the harm, and was probably
criminal" did not insulate from liability the owner of a truck left unlocked in violation of an ordinance.29 3 He refused to apply the family
car doctrine because the father was only the nominal owner and the
daughter who drove the car had supplied all the funds for its purchase
and maintenance.29 4 In Balinovic v. Evening StarNewspdper Co., perhaps
the most dramatic case in this group, Judge Edgerton held that liability
for injury caused by a newspaper's truck and its driver, commandeered
by the police for pursuit, could not be imposed upon the newspaper
company. He reasoned that at the time of the injury the driver "was
Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. oF PA. L. REv. 211, 242 (1924).
See dissent in District of Columbia v. Vignau, 144 F. 2d 641, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U. S. 781 (1944). Schear v. Ludwig, 143 F. 2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U. S. 734 (1944); Standard Oil Co. v. Sheppard, 148 F. 2d 363 (D.C.
Cir. 1945) ; Waugh v. Suburban Club Ginger Ale Co., 167 F. 2d 758 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
289 "If anything substantial is to be left of the jury's fact-finding function in the matter,
they cannot be prevented from considering policy and justice along with 'pure fact.' There
is no way of unscrambling the eggs, and giving the whites to the jury while the judge
gets the yolks." Edgerton, Book Review, 29 CoL. L. RBv. 229, 232 (1929).
290 "Whenever a jury decides that anything is 'reasonable' it gives effect to its ideas of
policy; it weighs interests." Edgerton, supra note 289, at 232.
291 124 F. 2d 825, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1941) ; the majority opinion was by Rutledge, J. The
treatments were for a pilonidal cyst, which after the treatments, necrosed and sloughed off.
292 137 F. 2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
293 Ross v. Hartman, 139 F. 2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 790 (1944).
This was reaffirmed in Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., 144 F. 2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
294 Smith v. Doyle, 98 F. 2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; this case was nullified by legislation
in effect at the time of the decision but enacted subsequent to the accident. See 98 F. 2d
at 344; Jones v. King, 113 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
287

288
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doing the work of the District of Colunbia"; that the government's
immunity did not shift liability to the company; that "chasing criminals" was remote from the work of the company; and that the news
company "by putting the driver on the road and keeping him there, did
not create the risk that the criminal-catching activities of the District
would injure a bystander.""9 5
He reversed a tort judgment for money damages against an employer
for a homicide which an employee had committed because the slain man
had taunted the employee and prevented him from obtaining drinking
water. He held that the killing was not within the scope of employment;
that the jury was not warranted in inferring that the employee "was
actuated by any other motive than the purely personal one 6f revenge.
• . .Where water is plentiful, a man does not break another's skull in

order to get it."2 9 6 In another case Judge Edgerton wrote for reversal
of a judgment against an employer on the ground that the employee
whose automobile caused the injury was a "free lance" salesman over
whose driving and course the employer did not have a degree of control
29 7
sufficient to impose vicarious liability

Judge Edgerton has uniformly urged recognition of liability for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on real property. In Eastburn v.
Levin he applied the attractive nuisance doctrine to sanction recovery
by a child injured in a junk yard by a junked car which the child could
not see from .the street. Distinguishing the leading case of United Zinc
Co. v. Britt,98 and relying upon more favorable Supreme Court decisions,
he said: "Junked cars attracted him and a junked car injured him. He
cannot be required to show that he was injured by the same specimen,
as well as the same species, which lured him to the premises ....

the

liability in question is less exceptional than is sometimes supposed.
Rather, the immunity of occupants of land, so far as immunity persists,
from responsibility for unreasonably dangerous conditions is one of the
exceptions to the growing and healthy tendency of the law to require all
295 1.13 F. 2d 505, 506, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 675 (1940). Rutledge,

J., dissented.
296 Park Transfer Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 142 F. 2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
297 Rabenovets v. Crossland, 137 F. 2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1943). In neither of these two

decisions, adverse to the plaintiffs, was relief for the injury altogether lacking. In the
Rabenovets case the very same opinion affirmed the judgment against the salesman. In
the Park Transfer Co. case, supra note 296, the family of the slain man had recovered
workman's compensation, and the suit in reality was by the compensation insurance
company to shift the loss to the employer or his insurer.
298 Holmes, J., 258 U. S. 268 (1922), which held that the dangerous condition causing
the injury must attract, i.e., be visible to, the trespassing child before he enters the
defendant's property.
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social conduct to conform to social standards."2 9 9 In Gleason v. Academy
of the Holy Cross00 Judge Edgerton rejected the traditional distinction
between social and business guests, or gratuitous licensees and business
invitees, and imposed liability upon a school for injury caused to a guest
by a hidden step. In Doctors Hospital v. Badgley8° the affirmative duty
of discovering wetness on a floor was imposed upon a hospital. In
Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. Hickey, in which a portable ventilator
owned by, a tenant fell from an outer window ledge and injured a passerby, Judge Edgerton held that "A landlord who keeps control of part of
his building and leases space to different tenants must use care to keep
the windows and screens, and the exterior generally, of the leased space
from becoming dangerous to passersby. It was appellant's duty not
merely to refrain from doing dangerous acts or creating dangerous conditions .. . it was also its duty to use reasonable care, i.e., to make
reasonable efforts, to discover and to eliminate such conditions if others
created them."' 02 He rejected the common law rule that a landlord has
no duty to light an outside stairway of an apartment house. 03 He
extended the landlord's duty of care of the common parts of an apartment house to the electrical system, including the switches in tenants'
apartments.3 0 4
He has construed the "last clear chance" doctrine broadly. The requirement that the person injured must be oblivious to the danger or unable
to extricate himself has been attenuated. 30 5 He even urged the extension
of the doctrine to cover a case in which, though the injured person had
seen the streetcar immediately before it struck her, the motorman, to
a mathematical certainty, had had ample opportunity to stop the car.306
In this field, too, he has not permitted technicalities to triumph over
3 07
realities and prevent a just result
299 113 F. 2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1940). But see Harris v. Roberson, 139 F. 2d 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1943), not involving a dangerous condition on land, however, in which the attractive
nuisance doctrine was held by Judge Edgerton not to extend "to things which become
dangerous only when adults set them in motion."
300 168 F. 2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
801 156 F. 2d 569 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
302 137 F. 2d 677, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
803 Kay v. Cain, 154 F. 2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
304 Gladden v. Fopenoe, 168 F. 2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
305 Schear v. Ludwig, 143 F. 2d 20, 21 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 323 U.S. 734 (1944).
306 Dissent in Capital Transit Co. v. Grimes, 164 F. 2d 718, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U. S. 845 (1948). See also dissent in Capital Transit Co. v. Smallwood, 162 F. 2d
14, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
307 See, for example, Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F. 2d 328 (D. C. Cir. 1938); dissent in

Christie v. Callahan, 124 F. 2d 825, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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THE MEASURE OF JUDGE EDGERTON'S WORK

Judge Edgerton's style is a powerful instrument of his art, and one
of his distinguishing qualities. His opinions, except a few concerning
civil rights," 7 are very brief. Eschewing both literary flourishes and
extensive authoritative quotations, he tailors his writing to the task
in hand with meticulous severity. The precision of his phrasing cuts
the point at issue to the bone; the less attentive reader may even feel
at times that he pares off some of the skeletal parts. His knack of
reasoning simply by contradictories, i.e., demolishing a proposition by
posing its opposite, makes it possible to omit intermediate links in the
chain of logic. This sparseness may sometimes convey an appearance
of austerity. Yet often the words strike fire and, as in the opening
phrases of the Bailey case opinion and in paragraphs of his Negro
rights cases, may even be deeply moving.
Any appraisal of a living and active judge is necessarily incomplete.
Yet it may be more useful to the bench and bar, and to the public, than
it would be if he had written his last opinion. Judge Edgerton's appointment was part of a new development 0 8-elevation to the bench of many
teachers of law-which aroused criticism in some quarters. 809 The work
of these jurists is a measure of the desirability of resorting to the
universities for judicial candidates.
Attempts have been made to prescribe the essential characteristics of
a good judge."' A single epochal achievement 3 1 or quality has sometimes been selected as the measure of greatness. Judge Learned Hand,
in his short eulogy of Mr. Justice Cardozo, emphasizes wisdom. "And
what is wisdom. .. ? I do not know; like you, I know it when I see it,
but I cannot tell of what it is composed." 312 Others have chosen statesmanship, 13 an admirable philosophy expressed with great literary art,3 14
or the "creative spirit".3 13 Since greatness is unique, its distinguishing
3071 See p. 184 supra.
308 See PRITCHETT, TnE ROOSEVELT COURT, 13 (1948).
309 Ibid.
310 Parker, The Judicial Office in the- United States, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 225, 227-229
(1948). Judge Parker lists: (1) character, i.e., intellectual and financial honesty, courage,
and sympathy, (2) ability, i.e., learning and wisdom, (3) independence, and (4) experience
in the practice of law.
311 Evatt, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in ESSAYS DEDICATED TO MR. JUSTICE C~ARozo (1939).
312 Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in EssAYs DEDICATED TO MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO
(1939).
313 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41 HARV. L. RLv. 121, 127,
140 (1927).

314 Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 HARv. L. REv. 682 (1931).
315 CARDozo, THE GRowTra or = LAW 89-93 (1924).
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marks must vary from person to person."'
Dean Pound has told us that four characteristics have caused certain
American judges to be "rated in the first rank": (1) mastery of the
lawyer's craft, (2) coincidence in time with a formative legal era, (3)
sound judicial technique and sound judgment and discretion in expounding, interpreting and applying the law, and (4) legal scholarship 17 In
discussing the work of Dean Pound's kinsman, Judge Pound, Edgerton
called him a great judge by these criteria and also in his varied knowledge
and understanding of life, his grasp of the background and meaning of
the diverse problems before his court, the excellence of his style, his
"tolerance toward statutes, judicial legislation and change," his "ability
to differentiate between the interests of the privileged class to which
judges belong and the interests of society," and his "impulse to protect
the interests of the unprivileged."3' 8 Two other qualities should be
mentioned; courage, which is indispensable to intellectual honesty, and
a sense of humor, so essential to objectivity and to clarity of understanding. By many of these standards Judge Edgerton ranks high in
the history of our judiciary and of our time.
316 "He is great who is what he is from Nature, and who never reminds us of others."
Emerson, Representative Men. Uses of Great Men 6 (Houghton Mfflin Co. 1903).
31 PoLLARD, MR. JusTicE CARmozo, A LIBERAL MiND i AcTioN (1935); foreword by
Roscoe Pound. Paraphrased by Edgerton in A Liberal Judge: Cuthbert W. Pound, 21
CoRNxL

L.Q. 7, 44 (1935).

318 Edgerton, supra note 317, at 45.

